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The lack of information on price discrimination regarding which characteristics of the client 
are used and how they influence the definition of the initial price offered in a competitive 
non-regulated taxi market is the main problem that encouraged this investigation. The study 
differs from other studies in its use of an experimental research method which allowed 
analysis of the problem as close as possible to the natural context of the phenomenon. 
Interviews with 10 taxi drivers produced six variables affecting the process of price definition. 
A group of 16 people matching those variables collected rates offered by a random sample of 
taxi drivers. Due to the lack of normality in the distribution of the prices collected, an ordered 
regression model was implemented. The findings are that price discrimination exists in a non-
regulated market such as that of taxis in Lima and that phenotype and the accent of the client 
are individual characteristics that have a significant influence on the initial price offer. The 
results confirm that price discrimination is applied in a context like the one of the study, but 
the question remains as to why it is naturally present and what conditions make it work. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Price determination is one of the basic aspects of the marketing mix, perhaps the one 
considered as the most important feature for business success (Kotler & Armstrong, 2008). In 
this context of pricing, price discrimination is an important issue to analyze in markets 
characterized by a non-regulated large supply with a heterogeneous demand where this 
pricing strategy can represent a vital factor for the existence of some services like the taxi 
service, a service that can be defined as inelastic in a short-run analysis (Anderson, McLellan, 
Overton, & Wolfram, 1997). In these types of markets, price discrimination is commonly 
present; a clear example is the non-regulated taxi market (no taximeter) in some developing 
economies. For example, in the city of Lima in Peru, the same service in the same point of 
sale (a street corner) is offered for a higher price to one person and a lower price to another. 
This context is very different from the more stable, more regulated, and seldom non-
monopolistic markets usually studied by economists that analyze price discrimination 
(Armstrong, 2005). 
Furthermore, most of the marketing studies on price discrimination focus on the 
characteristics and reactions of the buyers to the different prices and not on the characteristics 
of the clients that the sellers take into account to discriminate prices. The aim of this research 
was to try to identify the characteristics used by sellers to discriminate between customers 
when defining the initial price offered. With this purpose, this study aimed to confirm that 
price discrimination exists in this market, identify the main criteria for price discrimination 
(characteristics of the supplier and the demander), and then validate the relationship between 
all the variables identified. 
Background of the Problem 
When working with price, marketers have been concerned primarily with production 
costs even before thinking about sales, customers, or competition (Varble, 1980). Historically, 
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transaction prices have been defined through bargaining processes, but nowadays firms are 
concerned primarily about management convenience prioritizing fixed price policies. This 
management convenience of fixed price policies is also supported by a supposed more 
efficient transaction cost and a perceived fairness. People perceive greater fairness compared 
to the result of a bargaining process that usually implies some sort of price discrimination. In 
the United States of America, 31 states have some form of prohibition of price discrimination, 
either through general laws (such as the Unfair Practices Acts) or through special anti-price 
discrimination statutes (Grether, 1941; Turow, Feldman, & Meltzer, 2005). However, 
negotiated prices are used in agriculture as a possible means of gaining higher prices and, 
hopefully, higher incomes (Sullivan, 1969), and they are still used extensively in developing 
countries. 
“There is growing evidence that the assumption of pure self-interest in a bargaining 
situation is an inadequate explanation of behavior in many contexts. Often, people behave as 
if they care not only about their own well-being but also about the well-being of others” 
(Zwick & Chen, 1999). In a negotiating context, negotiators’ offers are often higher than the 
amount truly necessary to provoke the other party to accept (Corfman and Lehmann, 1993). 
The failure to predict subjects’ behavior in a bargaining process can reasonably be explained 
if the unobserved and uncontrolled elements of the bargainers’ utilities are connected with 
subjects’ perceptions of “fairness,” which involve comparing their share of the obtainable 
wealth to that of the other bargainer (Ochs and Roth, 1989). If the pricing rule (e.g., price 
discrimination strategy) is believed as fair, a price is judged fair (Dickson & Kalapurakal, 
1994). Negotiating seems to have a socially positive impact. In agriculture, for example, the 
economic effect seems to be superior for sellers, something that could be a consequence of the 
unobservable “fairness” that seems to be part of the bargaining process (Sullivan, 1969). A 
similar conclusion should apply to street taxi drivers. 
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The subject of this study is price discrimination, a subject closely related to the 
bargaining process. Bargaining is a process that has been previously investigated in the 
literature. Most of the studies have been realized in the United States and Western Europe 
where bargaining is not an extensive commercial phenomenon but is used only in the 
acquisition of products like cars, houses and secondhand goods. In these countries, a 
considerable part of the population probably never experiences price bargaining, and those 
who do may have only a few lifetime occasions to bargain (Abdul-Muhmin, 2001). 
Furthermore, researchers have sought to adopt laboratory experimental approaches to the 
study of bargaining behavior in these situations, with less emphasis on external validity and 
greater on internal validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Thus, the inquiry remains as to whether 
the results achieved in these studies have external validity in the sense of supporting across all 
bargaining situations. Specially, it is still unclear whether these results will be reproduced in a 
flexible-price market context where bargaining is a common commercial phenomenon. In 
flexible-price market environments as the described, consumers tend to have vast experience 
with bargaining and are prone to have developed rules-of-thumb to guide their behavior and 
expectations in future bargaining circumstances (Abdul-Muhmin, 2001). Most customers 
notice the concept of charging different amounts to different customers as unfair and often 
consider it to be illegal, particularly in online settings (Turow et al., 2005). Regardless of 
these consumer perceptions, price discrimination is legal in most circumstances, as long as the 
implementation is not centered on a “suspect category” such as race. Therefore, many firms 
use price discrimination strategies although the risk of adverse customer reactions (Haws & 
Bearden, 2006; Ramasastry, 2005). Third degree price discrimination is implemented in 
revenue management policies, by which firms selectively specify higher or lower prices to 
different segments of consumers (Ferguson, 2014; Wirtz & Kimes, 2007). 
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Statement of the Problem 
On two occasions, the municipality of the city of Lima has unsuccessfully tried to 
implement taximeters. The measure aimed to reduce the important problem of traffic 
congestion by standardizing rates with the purpose of eliminating the need of price 
negotiation before getting a taxi service (Aguirre, 2008). On both occasions, negotiations with 
price discrimination prevailed; a pricing strategy seems essential for the taxi services market 
to operate in a context like the city of Lima. It is therefore necessary to confirm that price 
discrimination exists in this commercial situation and to know which variables taxi drivers 
use and how they are used to differentiate their rates. These criteria could be very beneficial 
for the commercialization of other products and services in markets with high levels of 
competition and high heterogeneity of purchasing power among consumers. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this experimental study was to test the theory of price discrimination 
by determining customer characteristics taken into consideration by independent street taxi 
drivers (sellers), without price list or taximeter, when defining fares in the city of Lima, Peru. 
The main objective was to understand the price discrimination policy that remains in most 
markets in developing countries. An important aspect of the process is that sellers are usually 
meeting with the customer for the first time and have only a few seconds to gather visual 
information on which to offer an initial discriminated price. 
Significance of the Problem 
The aim of this research was to identify the customer- and seller-related factors for 
initial price discrimination that influence the bargaining processes in markets found in 
developing countries, which are characterized by an important economic heterogeneity. 
Countries like Mexico, where higher price elasticities were found among households living in 
rural areas (for soft drinks), in more marginalized areas and with lower income (Colchero, 
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Salgado, Unar-Munguia, Hernandez-Avila, & Rivera-Dommarco, 2015). In this sense, the 
aim of the research was to make a contribution to the academic field of marketing by studying 
a traditional system of price definition not yet fully understood. Another aim was to make a 
contribution to society, especially to developing countries, by finding factors that could be 
used as proxy of “economic power”. The researcher also wanted to make a contribution to the 
retail profession by highlighting some fundamental aspects of an existing price discrimination 
policy present in highly competitive markets. This might allow the development of a 
mechanism of price discrimination that could be applied to modern retail channels. 
Nature of the Study 
The focus of the research was the process of price discrimination occurring in 
transportation services, specifically, empirical taxi fare definition, taxis without taximeters, 
mobile applications or predefined tariff where excluded. The research consisted of two parts. 
The first stage was exploratory, in order to identify the main criteria for customer 
characteristics used by taxi drivers for initial price discrimination. To explore which criteria 
are taken into consideration to define initial prices, the investigation started with interviews 
with 10 taxi drivers who, it was assumed, practiced price discrimination to define the initial 
price offered to each potential client. Applying methodologies derived from the field of 
psychology, conscious and unconscious parameters used to discriminate prices were 
identified. It is important to remember that the seller is usually meeting the customer for the 
first time and for a limited amount of time and has only visual information in order to offer an 
initial discriminated price. 
Next, an experimental quantitative research was developed to validate and rank all the 
variables identified in the exploratory stage. With this purpose, if the initial prices, the 
dependent variable, were normally distributed, the intention was to implement a multiple 
regression with categorical variables to determine the statistically significant variables used 
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by sellers and the degree to which each variable affected the initial price offered to a 
customer. The alternative (that was adopted) was to conduct an analysis with an ordered 
regression model such as ordinal logit that respects the dependent variable as an ordinal 
multimodal outcome (Long, 1997).  
Price discrimination is present at the start of the bargaining process when an initial 
offer is made by the seller (taxi driver), and the bargaining process continues until the seller 
and the customer agree upon a price; this is how most taxi fares are defined in Lima. To study 
this process, an experimental research was designed with the purpose of preserving the natural 
context in which this process occurs. In a natural environment (a street corner), a group of 
interviewers stopped taxis and asked them the fare for a common journey from the starting 
point, and the initial price offer was noted. This process was repeated several times in order to 
complete a sample for each customer prototype, matching each customer prototype with a set 
of initial prices. Each customer prototype was characterized by an interviewer according to 
the experimental design based on the variables identified in the previous stage. 
Research Questions 
The research questions that guided the research were as follows: 
1. Does discrimination in the initial price in a non-regulated taxi market exist? 
2. What are the characteristics of customers that sellers consider when defining the 
initial price offer? 
3. Is there a significant relationship between external characteristics of customers and 
the price initially offered to them by sellers? 
These questions were used to help understand what characteristics sellers take into 
consideration when they discriminate initial prices across their customers, customers they 
meet for the first time and for only a few seconds before offering them the initial price of the 
service. This first evaluation done by the driver seemed to be very efficient, and most of the 
  7
time, any error in judgment should be corrected through the bargaining process. The research 
also helped understand what characteristics of the seller, if any, had an effect on initial prices. 
As important as it was to identify the variables used to discriminate prices, it was essential to 
determine the relative importance of these variables in the process. To know which variables 
were more important than others could help build a general model to discriminate prices 
based on the most relevant characteristics. In the future, this could also help derive the general 
model into specific instruments taking into consideration the precision and simplicity needed 
to be applied. A more precise instrument should include all the variables, but it becomes more 
complex to apply. Less precision is achieved with fewer variables (variables with less power 
of discrimination are not considered). 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
H01: Discrimination in the initial price does not exist in a non-regulated taxi market. 
Ha1: Discrimination in the initial price exists in a non-regulated taxi market. 
H02: There is no difference in the level of discrimination generated between the 
identified characteristics of customers. 
Ha2: There is a difference in the level of discrimination generated between the 
identified characteristics of customers. 
H03: There is no relationship between the external characteristics of customers and the 
initial price offered by sellers. 
Ha3: There is a relationship between the external characteristics of customers and the 
initial price offered by sellers. 
Theoretical Framework 
The general topic of this research is price discrimination in the empirical practice of 
price fixing. Pricing strategies for services or products take into consideration three main 
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ways to increase profits; the company owner can cut costs, sell more, or look for more profit 
with an improved pricing strategy. When sales are hard to increase and costs are already at 
their lowest, implementing a superior pricing strategy is a key decision to stay economically 
viable (Tellis, 1986).  
Raising prices is not always the way to go, especially in a poor economy. Too many 
businesses have failed because they priced themselves out of the marketplace. On the other 
hand, too many businesses leave “money on the table.” One pricing strategy does not fit all, 
so adopting the right one is a learning curve as we understand the needs and behaviors of 
customers and clients (Gregson, 2008). In this scenario, price discrimination plays an 
important role. As Samuelson and Marks (2008) described, first degree price discrimination 
implicates monopolistic pricing to sell at each customer’s maximum price. Second degree 
price discrimination is related to quantity discounts. Third degree price discrimination (the 
focus of this study) occurs when a business charges different prices to different customer 
groups, also known in the literature as variable consumer pricing (Heyman & Mellers, 2008). 
Finally, in fourth degree price discrimination prices are the same for different customers 
nevertheless costs to the firm may vary, also referred as reverse price discrimination as the 
effects are visible on the producer.  
The term price discrimination as used in this research refers to third degree price 
discrimination, closely related to dynamic pricing or flexible pricing mechanisms made 
possible by advances in technology and employed mainly online (Clay, Krishnan, Wolff, & 
Fernandes, 2002). Instead of cost structure or transactional characteristics that must be 
defensible to all customers relative to other prices and seller costs (e.g., Bolton & Alba, 2006; 
Bolton, Warlop, & Alba 2003), these firms often price discriminate based upon factors like 
location of service, temperature, time of purchase, or randomized price components between 
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different customer segments with some paying more and some less for the same service or 
product (Heyman & Mellers, 2008; Kimes & Wirtz, 2002).  
The discriminated initial prices fixed manually by the seller as a response to the 
characteristics of the client are related with the general topic. A cross-sectional quantitative 
research that includes experimental survey techniques to collect data was attempted. The 
dependent variable for the study was the initial price fixed by the seller; the independent 
variables were the characteristics of the need (the product or service required), and the 
moderating variables were the set of characteristics of the client, vehicle (the seller), and of 
the data collection (day and shift) (see Figure 1). As the independent variable, the 
characteristics of the need (the service required), remained fixed for the entire analysis, all 
moderating variables studied were treated as independent (see Figure 2). Those two models 
represent the hypothesis that the set of characteristics of the client influence the initial price. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the relationship between initial price and need 
characteristics, moderated by client, vehicle (seller), and data collection characteristics. 
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Figure 2. Conceptual framework of the relationship, where all moderating variables are 
treated as independent while the characteristics of the need remained fixed for the entire 
analysis. 
This kind of pricing strategy used to be present in flexible-price markets, which are 
defined as markets where most prices are negotiable. In developing countries, such contexts 
are commonly found, where prices for anything from shirts to refrigerators to cars and houses 
are negotiable (Kassaye, 1990). One of those countries is Peru, where the study was 
conducted. One of the first commercial rules a visitor to Peru learns from experiences is 
always to ask for a rebate or to make a counteroffer when shopping in traditional markets or 
taking a taxi. 
As mentioned by Abdul-Muhmin (2001), in such markets, a classic bargaining 
situation between a buyer and a seller occurs as follows: the buyer asks the seller how much is 
the product going for; the seller quotes a price which for this study is known as the initial 
price or initial offer; then follows a process of offers and counteroffers between the seller and 
the buyer until an agreement is made. In this study, the focus is on the first step of the 
bargaining process: the fixation of the initial price offer, a differentiated initial price 
according to the characteristics of the buyer. 
  11
Definition of Terms 
Third degree price discrimination refers to a price strategy in which prices vary by 
individual customers’ identity; the attribute in question is used as a proxy for ability and/or 
willingness to pay. For this kind of price discrimination, the supplier is capable of 
differentiating between consumer classes (Frank, 2010). 
The initial price or initial offer corresponds to the seller’s quoted price in answer to 
the customer’s question how much the product is going for. After this stage, the bargaining 
process continues (Abdul-Muhmin, 2001). 
Client characteristics refer to every characteristic of the customer noticeable in a few 
seconds and declared as relevant for fixing the initial price by the seller. Demographic 
characteristics such as sex and age, ethno-racial markers such as phenotype (physical 
complexion) and accent, and external appearance such as tidiness and attire were considered 
relevant for this research (Quijano, 2007). 
Customer prototype alludes to a customer with a specific set of the variables relevant 
for price discrimination. For this study, it was presumed there would be a vast variety of 
prototypes made up of different combinations of these variables. 
The vehicle characteristics indicate a set of external features of the seller that could 
have an influence in the initial price. Variables such as the color, brand, and year of the 
vehicle were considered relevant for the experiment. 
The data collection characteristics refer to the day (Saturday or Sunday) and the shift 
of data collection (morning, afternoon, and late afternoon and evening). 
The need characteristics refer to the set off variables defining the request of the client. 
For this study, the researcher fixed those characteristics. 
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Assumptions 
The first assumption was that taxi drivers interviewed would respond honestly to the 
interview process. Also, it was assumed that differences in operating cost between taxi drivers 
are non-significant due to the short distance of the ride. Another assumption was that 
interviewers representing different prototypes of taxi customers would be credible as 
customers to the taxi drivers.  
Scope and Limitations 
1. This study was limited to the competitive non-regulated taxi markets. 
2. This study was limited to subjects who agreed to participate voluntarily. 
3. This study was limited to the number of subjects surveyed and the amount of time 
available to conduct the study. 
4. The validity of this study is limited to the reliability of the instrument used. 
Delimitations 
This study was confined to a survey of street taxi drivers selected randomly by 
intercepting them at a street corner. The quantitative study focused on the key variables 
identified in the previous qualitative stage. Only independent street taxi drivers (those who do 
not belong to a taxi service company and without a price list, taximeter or mobile 
applications) were included in the study. The experiment took place on weekends because of 
the limited availability on weekdays of interviewers representing the different prototypes. The 
experiment extended over four weekends, instead of shorter period, to avoid producing an 
unnatural scenario of 16 interviewers in the same place simultaneously asking for prices to the 
same destination. The experiment was scheduled to be applied in a context where the supply 
of taxi service was higher than the demand, an extremely competing scenario where initial 
price definition was particularly important. Taking into account the conditions of the study, it 
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is assumed that there is no bias in the selection of taxis and that all have the same operating 
costs. 
Summary 
Price definition is one of the basic aspects of the marketing mix, perhaps the one 
considered as the most important feature for business success. This aspect is in clear 
contradiction of the fact that it is still an issue scarcely studied in the area of marketing.  
In this context, this research sought to understand, from a marketing point of view, 
which are the criteria used for price discrimination in markets characterized by a wide supply 
and a very heterogeneous demand. In these markets, price discrimination is commonly 
present; a clear example of this kind of market is the non-regulated taxi service market (no 
taximeter or mobile applications) where the same service in the same point of sale (a street 
corner) is offered for a higher price to one person and a lower price to another. This price 
discrimination seems to be an accepted and important mechanism that allows affordability in 
markets with economically heterogeneous customers.  
This research was developed in two key sections. The aim of the first section of the 
study was to identify the main criteria for initial price discrimination, and the purpose of the 
second section was to validate and rank all the variables identified in the previous stage. 
The first stage was exploratory, consisting of interviews with 10 taxi drivers who offer 
different initial prices to their customers, in order to explore what criteria they take into 
consideration to define initial prices. Methodologies derived from the field of psychology 
were applied to try to identify conscious and unconscious parameters used to discriminate 
prices. It is important to remember that the seller usually meets the customer for the first time 
for a limited amount of time and only gets visual information in order to decide the price. 
In the second stage, an experimental quantitative research was developed to validate 
and rank all the variables identified in the exploratory stage. To preserve the natural context, 
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in a natural environment (a street corner), a group of interviewers stopped taxis and asked 
them the fare for a common journey from the starting point. This process was repeated several 
times with the purpose of completing a sample for each customer prototype. Each customer 
prototype was characterized by an interviewer according to the experimental design based on 
the variables identified in the previous stage. The strategy of price discrimination studied in 
this research had the initial price as a dependent variable fixed according to the characteristics 
of the need, the independent variable, and varying according to each individual on the basis of 
a set of attributes used as a proxy for affordability or willingness to pay, a set of attributes of 
the vehicle, and a set of characteristics of the data collection, the moderating variables. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In order to research the factors used for price discrimination in non-regulated and 
highly competitive markets, a literature review centered on the following three subjects is 
considered: (a) dependent variable and price fixing strategies, (b) market segmentation, and 
(c) moderating variable and third generation price discrimination. 
Dependent Variable and Price Fixing Strategies 
Alt (1949) presented a short review about how price definition policies have evolved. 
It begins with the “total cost” policy, used to give sellers a very clear way to fix prices and to 
give customers a way to understand the price fixing. Simultaneously, the “average cost” 
policy was used in order to establish an adequate profit level. Later, before the Second World 
War, the development of monopolistic competition theories permitted the identification of 
several price policies for enterprises. At this time, economists tried to understand how the 
enterprise’s internal factors such as (a) organizational structure, (b) size, (c) type of property, 
and also its external factors such as (a) type of products, (b) industry costs, (c) industry 
maturity, (d) technology, (e) entry – out barriers, and (f) type of distribution channels may 
affect price fixation. These investigations permitted the development of price fixation policies 
such as the basing-point system, price leadership, zone pricing, base rating, and price 
stabilization, centered on the price definition policies from the producer’s point of view, 
lacking the retailer’s perspective. Most researchers have studied these policies in a 
monopolistic situation, and just a few of them have considered a context of competitive 
markets. The lack of studies of this issue makes it appropriate to recall the comment that 
Phillips (1946) made referring to the Second World War period:  
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Pricing has long been considered as a—perhaps—central marketing and business 
problem. A large amount of material has been accumulated on the history of price 
movements. Economics texts are full of discussions of price setting under various 
conditions—competition, monopoly, and, in recent years, monopolistic competition. 
Government records, particularly those of the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice, containing testimony on pricing practices are also voluminous. 
In spite of much discussion and research in this field, it is a fair statement that we still 
lack the basic, detailed case studies of price making which are necessary to a thorough 
understanding of the problems of pricing and, in turn, of the problems which grow out 
of various pricing methods. Researchers have not yet sat in with management groups 
as pricing problems are being settled, and recorded what actually takes place. 
Such case studies would be particularly valuable at the present time when both 
business and government are making important decisions based on assumptions as to 
how prices are made and as to which pricing methods are “good” and which are “bad.” 
(p. 21) 
Walker (1950) mentioned, “The most successful practitioners of this art [pricing] 
usually find it difficult to formalize their thinking on price making because intuitive 
judgments bulk large in pricing decisions.” A crucial contribution of consumer research to the 
matter of pricing is the founding that price perceptions are as much an issue of psychology as 
of economics (Bolton, Keh, & Alba, 2010). Pricing fixing and negotiation (bargaining) since 
the beginning of commerce have been closely related. Recently, even if prices used to be 
fixed, negotiation and bargaining have once again come into vogue. The economic recession 
in North America and Europe has made people and enterprises more focused on cost 
reduction. Cost reduction is obtained through more efficient processes and the decrease of 
supply costs. As Cressman (2006) noted, “when price is the primary focus, customers exhibit 
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price aggression—demanding price concessions from their suppliers—and prices get lower,” 
a negotiation procedure with a negative effect on profit. Such influences could be provoked 
partially by the existence of a non-discriminated initial price to start the bargaining process. 
On the other hand, in a commodity market, pricing higher than the competition, in the short 
term, is a good tactic, but the seller will be confined to a niche market, those willing to pay 
more, reducing the volume of work available, and minimizing the ability to use volume to 
reduce pricing (Kehoe, 2004). 
In the 21st century, this situation has changed because of the more important role 
assigned to clients and also because of the development and decrease in price of new data 
treatment technologies. These changes have permitted the creation of price models that allow 
the adaptation of prices to each specific client, mostly based on historic buying behavior. This 
kind of pricing policy looks to maximize the profit obtained with each customer and, 
consequently, with the whole market. The main goal in this way is then to arrive to the 
maximum segmentation level: marketing adapted to each specific consumer.  
Market Segmentation 
Market segmentation can be defined as dividing a market into distinct groups of 
customers with different characteristics, needs, or behavior, who might need separate products 
or who may respond differently to various mixes of marketing (Kotler & Armstrong, 2008). 
Some features of segmentation that may be used include geographic, demographic, 
psychographic, and behavioral. Effective segmentation typically needs that each segment is 
assessed on certain criteria such as size, growth potential, stability, accessibility, and 
responsiveness and whether the customers in that segment and the marketing efforts directed 
towards them are consistent with company goals and resources.  
Because a company has limited resources and must focus on how best to identify and 
serve its customers, segmentation is crucial. Each segment is characterized by a certain degree 
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of within-group homogeneity that helps ensure that the members of it will respond in similar 
ways to marketing efforts. This allows firms to apply marketing resources to each segment 
more efficiently. Of course, companies are interested to undertake segmentation strategies 
only if these efforts provide a positive return on investment. 
Although the benefits of segmentation are now extensively known, this must be 
weighed against the resource needed to put it in practice (Weinstein, 2004). The obstacles to 
implementation which practitioners are exposed to are diverse, ranging from lack of data and 
inappropriate personnel to operational problems and resistance to change. Even overcoming 
all of these problems, managers are under great pressure to demonstrate the impact and 
effectiveness of their segmentation plan (Dibb & Simkin, 2009). 
The goal of any segmentation is to make a better adaptation of the offer to the demand 
by identifying groups of consumers (segments) that are more prone to accept one’s products 
and services. Customer relationship management (CRM) looks to understand individual-level 
behavior, allowing firms to customize marketing campaigns to gradually smaller segments or 
even to individual customers (Peppers & Rogers, 1993). The development of customer 
databases and communication technologies (Xie & Shugan, 2001) has allowed firms to begin 
implementing tailored marketing strategies. This agrees with a growing body of empirical 
studies focused on the development of individual-level marketing policies (Lewis, 2005; Rust 
& Verhoef, 2005; Zhang & Krishnamurthi, 2004). 
Moderating Variable and Third Generation Price Discrimination 
Setting prices to consumers is one of the most critical decisions for a retailer as it is a 
primary driver of his profitability. To increase profitability, retailers usually employ some sort 
of price discrimination. For successful price discrimination, economists used to say that the 
following conditions are necessary: (a) the company must be capable to discriminate between 
different market segments, such as industrial users and domestic users; (b) each segment must 
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have a different price elasticity; (c) markets must be kept separate, either by physical distance, 
time, or nature of use; (d) there must be no seepage between two markets, which means that a 
consumer cannot purchase at the low price in the elastic sub-market and then re-sell to other 
consumers in the inelastic sub-market, at a higher price; and (e) the firm must have some 
degree of monopoly power. The three later conditions are strictly necessary in an analysis 
from the marketing point of view. For instance, in very competitive contexts, retailers often 
vary prices across stores to exploit demand differences between trading areas, consistent with 
a strategy of third degree price discrimination. For example, higher prices are often found in 
stores that are situated in areas with a smaller number of shopping alternatives (Goodman, 
2003). Researchers have study how setting optimal retail prices based on competitive factors 
and observed demographic that can be related to demand characteristics (Chintagunta, Dubé, 
& Singh 2003; Montgomery, 1997). Cowan (2016) found that, when demand functions in 
different markets are derived from distributions of reservation prices that differ only in their 
means, conditions exist such that third‐degree price discrimination leads to greater total output 
and greater total welfare compared to uniform price. For example, Graddy (1995) noticed that 
sellers of the New Fulton Fish Market were quoting lower prices to Asian customers for the 
same box of fish compared to white customers. Lii (1995) noted that Asian customers seemed 
to be price oriented because they resell the product they buy in Chinatown, and they need to 
maintain the reputation of the cheapest place to buy seafood in New York City. Store owners 
claimed they must keep their price low due to fierce competition and the fact that “most of 
their customers’ blue-collar workers simply cannot pay more.” A change in customers’ needs 
or in the competitive environment can justify the need for segmentation and even price 
discrimination. Chen, Hu, Szulga, & Zhou (2018) noted that in the Chinese automobile 
market gender has a large and statistically significant conditional effect on car price and local 
consumers pay significantly less for vehicles than non-local consumers. Fabra (2018) found 
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that in market characterized with lower search costs, price discrimination benefits small and 
large buyers compare to medium ones, and smaller ones are more benefited than larger ones. 
Namata, Ostaszewski, and Sahoo (1990) indicated that despite the importance of pricing 
strategy for retailer profitability, there is a limited understanding of the relative effectiveness 
of the price discrimination mechanisms available to the retailer. 
A common and implicit notion in the literature on imperfect price competition is that 
buyers who compare prices across different products are able to remember perfectly all the 
prices they come across and use them in their decision making. However, there is a 
considerable body of psychological research that examines the consequence of memory 
limitations on consumer choice among existing alternatives. Limitations on short-term 
memory involve that consumers would not be capable to recall exactly relevant price 
information, and consumers are more likely to face greater limitations of short-term memory 
in environments with higher levels of information. Imperfect short-term memory of prices is 
well-documented for consumers buying products purchased routinely or products with low 
involvement. (Dickson & Sawyer, 1990; Monroe & Lee, 1999). Faced with memory 
constraints, consumers make choices using heuristics that help them shape suitable price 
impressions. A relevant heuristic to deal with the large quantity of information is the grouping 
of objects, events, or numbers into categories based on their perceived similarities (Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975). 
The analysis found quite a few effects of limited consumer recall that are remarkably 
uniform across the different categorization processes and market environments. When 
consumers compare either a label to an observed price (asymmetric categorization) or 
category labels (symmetric categorization), the ideal strategy for the consumers calls for 
accurate categorization toward the bottom of the equilibrium price distribution. This implies 
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that in equilibrium, consumers should allocate greater memory resources to encoding lower 
prices to encourage firms to put greater importance on charging more favorable prices. 
The literature review shows that economists have studied the price discrimination 
issue in depth, but that is not the same for marketers. As several authors have noted, there are 
not many studies on this subject from the marketing point of view. In fact, although some 
researchers have analyzed some general items that may be used as price determination 
criteria, no one has focused on identifying scientifically what these criteria are, and no one has 
analyzed this issue in a competitive market situation (such as the non-regulated taxi market in 
some developing countries). That is why an aim of this research was to seek to determine how 
the characteristics of the client, the seller, and the data collection conditions play a moderating 
role in the definition of the initial price fixed for each client. The dependent variable was the 
initial price fixed for each client. The independent variable of the study was a set of variables 
describing the characteristics of the need. All the characteristics of the need were controlled 
and remained the same for the whole study. Only the characteristics of the client, the seller, 
and the data collection considerations could vary. The client characteristics refer to every 
characteristic of the customer noticeable in a few seconds and declared as relevant for fixing 
the initial price by the seller. Demographic characteristics such as sex and age, ethno-racial 
markers such as phenotype (physical complexion) and accent, and external appearance such 
as tidiness and attire were considered relevant for this research. The vehicle characteristics 
indicated a set of external features of the seller that could have an influence in the initial price. 
Variables such as the color, brand, and year of the vehicle were considered relevant to be 
gathered for the experiment. The data collection characteristics refer to the day (Saturday or 
Sunday) and the shift of data collection (morning, afternoon, and late afternoon and evening). 
The strategy of price discrimination studied in this research was based on how the relationship 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable was moderated by a set of 
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attributes of the client, used as a proxy for affordability or willingness to pay, the seller, and 
of the data collection. 
Summary 
In order to research the factors used for price discrimination in non-regulated and 
highly competitive markets, the literature review focused on the following three subjects: (a) 
dependent variable and price fixing strategies, (b) market segmentation, and (c) moderating 
variable and third generation price discrimination. A price fixing strategy in the 21st century 
is more oriented to the role assigned to the clients and is able to process much more data due 
to the development and decrease in price of new data treatment technologies. These changes 
have permitted the creation of price models that allow the adaptation of prices to each specific 
client, mostly based on historic buying behavior. This kind of pricing policy looks to 
maximize the profit obtained with each customer and, consequently, with the whole market. 
The main goal is to arrive at the maximum segmentation level: marketing adapted to each 
specific consumer. 
Market segmentation can be defined as dividing a market into different groups of 
customers with distinct characteristics, needs, or behavior, who might require separate 
products or who may react differently to various marketing mix efforts (Kotler & Armstrong, 
2008). Effective segmentation typically needs that each segment is assessed on certain criteria 
such as size, growth potential, stability, accessibility, and responsiveness and whether the 
customers in that segment and the marketing efforts directed towards them are consistent with 
company goals and resources. The goal of segmentation is for a company to make a better 
adaptation of the offer to the demand by identifying groups of consumers (segments) that are 
more prone to accept its products and services. The development of customer databases and 
communication technologies (Xie & Shugan, 2001) has allowed firms to begin implementing 
tailored marketing strategies. This agrees with a growing body of empirical studies focused on 
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the development of individual-level marketing policies (Lewis, 2005; Rust & Verhoef, 2005; 
Zhang & Krishnamurthi, 2004). 
Third degree price discrimination is a usual way used by retailers to increase 
profitability. In very competitive contexts, retailers often vary prices across stores to exploit 
demand differences between trading areas, consistent with a strategy of third degree price 
discrimination. Namata et al. (1990) indicated that despite the importance of pricing strategy 
for retailer profitability, there is a limited understanding of the relative effectiveness of the 
price discrimination mechanisms available to the retailer. The literature review shows that 
economists have studied the price discrimination issue, but there is not much research on price 
discrimination from the marketing point of view. Studies that exist tend to analyze some 
general criteria to determine prices, but the literature did not reveal anyone focused on 
identifying scientifically what these criteria are, and no one has analyzed this issue in a 
competitive market situation (such as the non-regulated taxi market in developing countries). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
The purpose of this experimental study was to test the theory of price discrimination 
by determining customer characteristics taken into consideration by independent street taxi 
drivers (sellers), without price list or taximeter, when defining fares (initial prices) in the city 
of Lima, Peru. The main objective was to understand the price discrimination policy that 
exists in most markets in developing countries. In this process, it is important to remember 
that sellers are usually meeting customers for the first time and have only visual information 
on which to offer an initial discriminated price. The research consisted of an exploratory 
qualitative first stage to identify the main customer characteristics taken into account by the 
sellers, followed by an experimental quantitative research using statistics to validate and rank 
the factors found for initial price discrimination in a competitive non-regulated market. The 
findings may be useful for better understanding of price discrimination, which is a common 
practice in competitive markets in countries with important economic heterogeneity, 
particularly in developing countries. 
Research Design 
To answer the question which customer characteristics independent street taxi drivers 
(sellers) take into consideration when defining initial prices in the city of Lima, an 
experimental research was done to preserve the natural context in which this process occurs. 
In a natural environment (a street corner), a group of interviewers stopped taxis and asked 
them the fare for a common journey from the starting point. This process was repeated several 
times in order to gain a complete and representative sample for each customer prototype. Each 
customer prototype was characterized by an interviewer according to the experimental design 
based on the variables identified in the first stage. In this experiment, the dependent variable 
was the initial price fixed by the seller, the independent variables were the characteristics of 
the need (the service or product required), and the moderating variables were the 
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characteristics of the client. The moderating variables could be nominal or continuous, for 
example, the type of clothing, skin color, sex, or age, while the dependent variable could be 
continuous in nature or categorical if not normally distributed. Variables such as the brand 
and year of production of the taxi were also gathered to analyze whether they had a 
moderating effect on the relationship. In order to identify qualitatively the main features taken 
into account in determining a price, 10 taxi drivers were interviewed. The 10 interviews were 
conducted with drivers recruited at the same corner where the quantitative research was 
performed. By analyzing these interviews, the variables and levels that explain the variability 
in the initial price offered were identified. With this information, interviewers were recruited 
who represented the largest number of combinations of these variables. Each combination of 
these variables corresponded to what was called a customer prototype.  
Even after careful selection of the factors and levels for a study, the overall number of 
potential prototypes is frequently too large and unmanageable in an experiment like this one. 
To solve this problem, a suitable fraction of all possible combinations of the factor level was 
used by implementing a full-profile approach using what is termed a fractional factorial 
design. The resulting set, named an orthogonal array, was designed to capture the main effects 
for each factor level. Interactions between levels of one factor with levels of another factor 
were assumed to be negligible. After identifying the set of prototypes to evaluate, one of the 
most delicate steps of the experiment ensued, the recruitment of interviewers. Each 
interviewer recruited was chosen to match with each prototype resulting from fractional 
factorial designs. Before proceeding with the experiment, a quality control stage of the 
prototypes took place. For this purpose, a sample of drivers was recruited and asked to 
evaluate whether each prototype represented the required characteristics. Each potential 
interviewer recruited, corresponding to one of the prototypes, was maintained only if a 
significant number of drivers answered according to expectations, so that one could conclude 
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that there was consistency between the prototype and observation. All prototypes that 
received a significantly different evaluation from what was desired were optimized or 
replaced and then evaluated again to achieve consistency. After validating the set of 
prototypes, the experiment was performed.  
The experiment took place on weekends, due to the availability of all interviewers, and 
in three shifts from 08:00 to 12:00, 12:00 to 16:00, and 16:00 to 20:00 in a general context 
where the supply of taxi service is higher than demand, an extremely competing scenario 
where initial price definition is extremely important. In a natural environment, a specific street 
corner, each prototype stopped taxis and, following a strict questionnaire (discourse), they 
asked them the fare for the same common journey from that starting point. The initial price 
offered by the taxi driver was recorded, and this process was repeated several times in order to 
complete a sample of initial prices for each customer prototype. Cases where a taxi driver 
refused to give an initial price or before giving an initial price asked how much the customer 
was willing to pay were discarded from the experiment. As a result of this last stage of 
gathering information, data were obtained with the following characteristics listed in columns: 
a column represented the dependent variable, the price indicated by the driver, and each of the 
following columns corresponded to the feature set of the prototype that had requested the 
price. With these data, a multilevel ordinal logistic regression analysis was conducted. The 
regression weights provided a quantitative measure of the effect of each on the price variation. 
To perform a multilevel ordinal logistic regression analysis requires coding responses 
recorded as text. To code the responses, first they were grouped based on similarity with the 
aim of detecting responses that differed only due to typographical errors or extra spaces. 
Because the dependent variable was not normally distributed, an analysis with an ordered 
regression model such as ordinal logit that respects the dependent variable as an ordinal 
multimodal outcome (Long, 1997) was conducted. 
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To answer the question which characteristics of their customers are taken into 
consideration by independent street taxi drivers (sellers), without price list or taximeter, when 
defining fares (initial prices) in the city of Lima, Peru, first, a preliminarily identification of 
the characteristics used by taxi drivers to discriminate prices between one client and another 
was made, and then the relevance of each of them in this process was quantitatively validated 
and measured. For the quantitative part of the study, a field experimental research was 
executed to preserve the natural context in which this process occurs. An experimental 
research was necessary because the aim was to identify the effect existing between the 
customer’s characteristics (moderating variables) and the initial price proposed to a customer 
(dependent variable). The brand and year of production of the taxi car were also gathered to 
analyze whether they were significant in the relationship as moderating variables. 
Research Questions 
The following research questions guided the research: 
1. Does discrimination in the initial price in a non-regulated taxi market exist? 
2. What are the characteristics of customers that sellers consider when defining the 
initial price offer? 
3. Is there a significant relationship between external characteristics of customers and 
the price initially offered to them by sellers? 
The purpose of these questions was bring about understanding of what characteristics 
are taken into consideration by sellers when they discriminate initial prices across their 
customers, remembering that they are meeting customers for the first time and for only a few 
seconds before offering them the initial price for the service. This evaluation seems to be very 
efficient and most of the time, the deviation can be corrected through the bargaining process. 
The research was also designed to understand what characteristics of the seller and of the data 
collection, if any, influenced the relationship. 
  28
As important as it was to identify the variables used to discriminate prices, it was very 
important to determine the relative importance of these variables in the process. To know 
which variables are more important than others could help one to build a general model to 
discriminate prices based on the relevant characteristics. In the future, this could also help 
derive the general model into specific instruments taking into consideration the precision and 
simplicity needed to be applied. A more precise instrument should include all the variables, 
but if it becomes more complex to apply, less precision is achieved with fewer variables 
(variables with less power of discrimination are taken off). 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
H01: Discrimination in the initial price does not exist in a non-regulated taxi market. 
Ha1: Discrimination in the initial price exists in a non-regulated market. 
H02: There is no difference in the level of discrimination generated between the 
identified characteristics of customers. 
Ha2: There is a difference in the level of discrimination generated between the 
identified characteristics of customers. 
H03: There is no relationship between the external characteristics of customers and the 
initial price offered by sellers. 
Ha3: There is a relationship between the external characteristics of customers and the 
initial price offered by sellers. 
Population 
The study universe corresponded to the population of taxi drivers in Lima, Peru, who 
do not have a meter or tariff to price for their services. According to the Federación Nacional 
de Taxis y Colectivos, the estimated population of taxis is 240,000 units (Federación de Taxis 




Because the collection of information was the result of field work, it was impossible to 
require informed consent. If consent had been requested before starting the experiment, it 
would have skewed the information. Neither could it be applied immediately after obtaining 
the information, given that taxi drivers were doing their job (driving) and would immediately 
be looking for a new customer. 
Sampling Frame 
To carry out the interviews, convenience sampling was used to choose a group of 
drivers who agreed to participate. For the experiment, taxis who were interviewed were 
selected according to a systematic sampling technique; the interviewers asked the rates for a 
specific journey from every third taxi passing through the point of data collection. This 
process was repeated several times to complete a sample over 100 cases for each customer 
prototype. For generalization of the results, the ratio of observations to independent variables 
should never fall below 5:1, implying that five observations are made for each independent 
variable in the variate. Even though the minimum ratio is 5:1, the objective in this research 
was to have between 15 to 20 observations for each independent variable (Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson, & Tatham, 2010). 
Confidentiality 
The data were kept confidential respecting the anonymity of all participants. All 
information obtained from the interviews was kept in a file without any information allowing 
the identification of the informant. In the field experiment, it was almost impossible to gather 
information that allowed identification of individual taxi drivers, so their anonymity and 
confidentiality were assured. 
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Geographic Location 
Given the complexity of the experiment and to have the maximum control in it, the 
data collection took place on one corner that is characterized by having a high number of taxis 
and a large variety of clients. The experiment was conducted at a busy street corner located in 
the Miraflores district in the city of Lima. 
Instrumentation 
For the purpose of this research, an interview guide (see Appendix A) was employed 
to identify the parameters used by taxi drivers to discriminate prices between one client and 
another, and during the experiment, a questionnaire, including a strict discourse, was used to 
record the characteristics of the prototype and the initial price offered for the journey. Before 
proceeding with the experiment, there was a quality control stage of the prototypes. For this 
purpose, a sample of drivers was recruited to whom each of the prototypes was shown in 
order to evaluate whether each prototype represented the required characteristics. Each 
potential interviewer recruited, corresponding to one of the prototypes, was maintained only if 
a significant number of drivers answered according to expectations, so that one could 
conclude that there was consistency between the prototype and observation. All prototypes 
that received a significantly different evaluation from what was desired were optimized or 
replaced and then evaluated again to achieve consistency before the experiment was 
performed. 
Data Collection 
In order to identify qualitatively the main features taken into account in determining 
an initial price, interviews were conducted with 10 taxi drivers. These interviews were with 
drivers recruited on the same corner where the quantitative research was performed. The 
interviews were recorded using a digital recorder. Then, these recordings were transferred to a 
computer to be transcribed manually into a grid for analysis. Finally, all the features used by 
  31
taxi drivers to discriminate the initial price were coded in order to identify the main 
characteristics used for this purpose. In order to validate these variables and quantify their 
importance in the process of price discrimination, a field experiment was conducted in a 
natural environment, a specific street corner, where a group of prototypes (people with a set of 
features, observing a fractional factorial design) stopped taxis and asked them the fare for a 
specific journey starting from the experiment location. All asked for the same destination and 
followed the same discourse (according to a strict questionnaire). This process was repeated 
several times throughout the schedule to complete a sample for each customer prototype. All 
initial prices received were recorded on a paper questionnaire. These questionnaires were 
typed in order to build a database to perform appropriate statistical analysis. 
Data Analysis 
Multiple regression is the suitable method of analysis when the research problem 
alludes to a single metric dependent variable (price) supposed to be related to two or more 
metric independent variables, or non-metric if coded. As the independent variable, the 
characteristics of the need (the service required), remained fixed for the entire analysis, all 
moderating variables were treated as independent. The objective of the multiple regression 
analysis was to forecast the changes in the dependent variable (price) as a reaction to changes 
in the independent variables (customer characteristics). 
Because categorical predictor variables were identified, and they cannot be entered 
directly into a regression model and be meaningfully interpreted, they were coded. To code 
them, first, the responses were grouped based on similarity, aiming to detect responses that 
differed only due to typographical errors or extra spaces. After identifying the main variables 
used by taxi drivers to discriminate prices among potential customers, the general linear 
model program in Stata was used to execute a multiple regression. 
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Prior to multiple regression analysis, it is necessary to identify the existence of 
possible outliers in the data. To do this, the univariate, bivariate, and multivariate diagnostic 
methods were applied, as described by Hair et al., 2010: 
Univariate methods examine all metric variables to identify unique or extreme 
observations. For small samples (80 or fewer observations), outliers typically are 
defined as cases with standard scores of 2.5 or greater. For larger sample sizes, 
increase the threshold value of standard scores up to 4. Bivariate methods focus their 
use on specific variable relationships, such as the independent versus dependent 
variables. We will use a scatterplot with confidence intervals at a specified alpha of 
5%. Multivariate methods, best suited for examining a complete variate, such as the 
independent variables in regression. Threshold levels for the tf/df measure should be 
conservative (.005 or .001), resulting in values of 2.5 (small samples) versus 3 or 4 in 
larger samples. (p. 66) 
To maximize the prediction from the selected independent variables, one should look 
for independent variables that have low multicollinearity with the other independent variables 
but also have high correlations with the dependent variable. It is necessary to analyze the 
linearity of the relationship between dependent and independent variables, representing the 
degree to which the change in the dependent variable is associated with the independent 
variable: 
The regression coefficient is constant across the range of values for the independent 
variable. The concept of correlation is based on a linear relationship, thus making it a 
critical issue in regression analysis. Linearity of any bivariate relationship is easily 
examined through residual plots. (Hair et al., 2010, p. 180) 
The next step in the analysis was look for a constant variance of the error term with 
residual plots, plotting the residuals (studentized) against the predicted dependent values and 
  33
comparing them to the null plot and Levene test. The next test was to look for the 
independence of the error terms that each predicted value is independent, not related to any 
other prediction; that is, they are not sequenced by any variable (Hair et al., 2010). To 
accomplish this, the residuals were plotted against any possible sequencing variable. If the 
residuals are independent, the pattern should appear random and similar to the null plot of 
residuals. The final test before proceeding to execute the multiple regression was to test 
normality of the error term distribution and normality of the independent or dependent 
variables or both. For this purpose, the normal probability plots were used to compare the 
standardized residuals with the normal distribution (Hair et al., 2010). 
To select the independent variables, the stepwise estimation method was used because 
it enables one to examine the contribution of each independent variable to the regression 
model, adding first the independent variable with the greatest contribution followed by 
variables with decreasing contribution to the equation (Hair et al., 2010). The multiple 
regression model obtained was tested to examine its statistical significance, testing the 
coefficient of determination. Then the significance tests of regression coefficients were 
carried out. 
The following possibilities were considered. If the dependent variable (price) showed 
responses were highly concentrated and overlapping normal distribution in the histogram 
showed a huge deviation from a normal distribution, the dependent variable would be 
considered as not normally distributed. If transforming of the dependent variable (logarithms) 
did not solve the problem, then transforming the variable into a dichotomy using the mode as 
a threshold value would be considered. It would lose variability, but it would allow estimating 
a less restrictive model without imposing normality assumptions. In the case of a lack of 
normality in the dependent variable, some of the responses would be categorized in the 
dependent variable and transformed into a categorical variable. One characteristic of the new 
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categorical variable would be that it would retain its cardinal properties; that is, categories can 
be ranked from low to high except that one cannot note the distances between adjacent 
categories. This situation would justify conducting an analysis with an ordered regression 
model such as ordinal logit that respects the dependent variable as an ordinal multimodal 
outcome (Long, 1997). 
In a typical ordinary least squares (OLS) model, the assumption is that responses 
collected are not biased because they are all within one level: every price collected gave the 
characteristics of the client, and the assumption was that such characteristics were 
independent of each other. If they were not, one possible solution was to ignore the existence 
of such a variation. If the prices were, in effect, correlated with clients, it would always be 
possible that coefficients associated with higher level-unit of analysis characteristics might be 
unbiased and the standard errors underestimated, leading to spurious estimates. Another 
alternative solution to explore was to collapse the Level 1 data to Level 2, ignoring the within-
surveyors’ variation and then run a classical OLS model. The consequence would be to lose 
variation and more likely to inflate the coefficients of the relationship and be trapped into an 
ecological fallacy, leading to the conclusion that the relationships observed between higher-
level units could be extended to lower-level units. To take advantage of the implicit research 
design of this research, a multilevel strategy was contemplated with a given set of random 
prices (Level 1 unit) to be collected by the same client, a surveyor in the field (Level 2 unit). 
The nesting (clustering) of prices within the same client made it more likely to expect that the 
dependent variable would lack independence, that is, that the prices would tend to be similar 
rather than to exhibit more variation. Multilevel modeling allowed the appropriate addressing 
of one of the key questions of the research: whether the prices were correlated with the traits 
of the clients. It is possible to decompose what part of the total variation observed in prices 
could be attributed to traits that correspond to the taxi drivers or the characteristics of the unit 
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and what part could be attributed to the traits of the surveyor. If the latter share of variation 
was statistically significant different from zero, the initial hypothesis on the role of client 
characteristics to set the price could be tested. In this context, fixed effects were the proper 
model because the focus of the study was on the effects of the Level 2 units in the sample. If 
the Level 2 units were a sample of a larger universe, then the random coefficients would make 
sense, and the results could be generalized to such a population (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
The multilevel ordered regression analysis was implemented in Stata 14 using the command 
mixed effects ordinal logistic regression (meologit). 
Validity and Reliability 
The internal validity of the research was grounded, taking into consideration the eight 
factors of Campbell and Stanley (1963): (a) during the experiment, care was taken that no 
special event influenced the results, (b) during the experiment, no psychological changes 
occurred within the subjects, (c) all testing of instruments was performed to different subjects 
having no direct influence on those members of the main sample, (d) all instruments were 
tested several times to ensure they would work well during the experiment, (e) internal 
validity related to statistical regression was ensured by identifying and excluding all abnormal 
cases, outliers, and influential observations, (f) the experiment was performed on 32 samples, 
the minimum number of samples possible taking into consideration the number of prototypes, 
and with a 12-hour period of data gathering divided in three shifts, to limit the existence of a 
differential selection, (g) experimental mortality could be represented by the fact that a taxi 
driver might not agree to give a price for the journey, something difficult to control but 
something very unlikely to happen, and finally (h) the experiment was performed as naturally 
as possible in such a way that one subject would not influence others. 
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Summary 
The purpose of this experimental study was to test the theory of price discrimination 
by determining customer characteristics taken into consideration by independent street taxi 
drivers (sellers), without price list or taximeter, when defining fares (initial prices) in the city 
of Lima, Peru. The main objective of the study was to understand the price discrimination 
policy that exists in most markets in developing countries. An important aspect of the process 
is that sellers are usually meeting the customer for the first time and have only visual 
information on which to offer an initial discriminated price. The research consisted of an 
exploratory qualitative first stage to identify the main customer characteristics taken into 
account by the sellers. Interviews were conducted with 10 drivers recruited on the same 
corner where the quantitative research was performed. This was followed by an experimental 
quantitative research to statistically validate and rank the factors found for initial price 
discrimination in competitive non-regulated markets. In a natural environment (the street 
corner), a group of interviewers stopped taxis and asked them the fare for a common journey 
from the starting point; the initial price offered by the taxi driver was recorded. This process 
was repeated several times to complete a sample for each customer prototype. Each customer 
prototype was characterized by an interviewer according to the experimental design based on 
the variables identified in the previous stage. In this experiment, the independent variables 
were the characteristics of the client, which might be nominal or continuous, for example, the 
type of clothing, skin color, sex, or age, while the dependent variable which corresponds to 
the initial price offered by the driver for the journey is continuous in nature. The number of 
the prototypes and their characteristics were defined according to a fractional factorial design, 
which presents a suitable fraction of all possible combinations of the factor levels. Each 
prototype (interviewer) was recruited and tested to match correctly with each prototype 
resulting from fractional factorial designs. After validation of the set of prototypes, the 
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experiment was performed. This last stage of gathering provided the following data listed in 
columns: a column represented the dependent variable, the price indicated by the driver, and 
each of the following columns corresponded to the feature set of the prototype that requested 
the price. Using these data, a multilevel ordinal logistic regression analysis was conducted. 
The regression weights provided a quantitative measure of the influence of each on the price 
variation. To perform a multilevel ordinal logistic regression analysis requires coding 
responses recorded as text. To code the responses, they were grouped first based on similarity 
to detect responses that differed only due to typographical errors or extra spaces. The research 
questions that guided the research were as follows: 
1. Does discrimination in the initial price in a non-regulated taxi market exist? 
2. What are the characteristics of customers that sellers consider when defining the 
initial price offer? 
3. Is there a significant relationship between external characteristics of customers and 
the price initially offered to them by sellers? 
 The study universe corresponded to the population of taxi drivers in Lima, Peru, who 
do not have a meter or tariff to price their services. The estimated population of taxis is 
240,000 units (Federación de Taxis del Perú, 2011). Because the collection of information 
was the result of field work, it was impossible to obtain informed consent; if requested before 
starting the experiment, it would have skewed the information collected, and it could not be 
requested immediately after obtaining the information because taxi drivers were doing their 
job (driving or looking for a new customer). Convenience sampling was used to choose a 
group of drivers for the 10 initial interviews. Taxis to be interviewed were selected according 
to a systematic sampling technique. This process was repeated several times to complete a 
sample over 100 cases for each customer prototype. Although the minimum ratio for 
generalization of the results is 5:1, between 15 to 20 observations were obtained for each 
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independent variable (Hair et al., 2010). Given the complexity of the experiment and the need 
for greater control, it took place at one street corner with a large number of taxis and a high 
variety of clients. The experiment was performed on weekends, due to the availability of all 
interviewers, and in three shifts from 08:00 to 12:00, 12:00 to 16:00, and 16:00 to 20:00 in a 
general context where the supply of taxi services was higher than demand and extremely 
competitive where initial price definition is imperative. 
In order to identify qualitatively the main features taken into account in determining 
an initial price, 10 taxi drivers were interviewed employing an interview guide. In order to 
validate these variables and quantify their importance in the process of price discrimination, a 
field experiment was conducted using a questionnaire to record the characteristics of the 
prototype and the initial price offered. Because the independent variable, the characteristics of 
the need (the service required), remained fixed for the entire analysis, all moderating variables 
studied were treated as independent. For this purpose, a multiple regression was the 
appropriate method of analysis because the research problem involved a single metric 
dependent variable (price) presumed to be related to two or more metric independent variables 
or non-metric if dummy coding was performed. This objective was achieved through the 
statistical rule of least squares. Prior to multiple regression analysis, it is necessary to identify 
the existence of possible outliers in the data. To do this, the univariate, bivariate, and 
multivariate diagnostic methods were applied. To maximize the prediction from the selected 
independent variables, independent variables were sought that had low multicollinearity with 
the other independent variables but also had high correlations with the dependent variable. 
The linearity of the relationship between dependent and independent variables was analyzed, 
representing the degree to which the change in the dependent variable is associated with the 
independent variable. The next step was to look for a constant variance of the error term with 
residual plots, plotting the residuals (studentized) against the predicted dependent values and 
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comparing them to the null plot and Levene test. Next, the independence of the error terms 
was tested to find out whether each predicted value was independent, not related to any other 
prediction; that is, they were not sequenced by any variable (Hair et al., 2010). The final test 
before proceeding to performing the multiple regression was to test normality of the error 
term distribution, normality of the independent or dependent variables, or both (Hair et al., 
2010). The stepwise estimation method was used to select the independent variables (Hair et 
al., 2010). The multiple regression model obtained was tested to examine its statistical 
significance, testing the coefficient of determination. Then, the significance tests of regression 
coefficients were carried out. If the dependent variable (price) were considered as not 
normally distributed and transforming of dependent variable (logarithms) did not solve the 
problem, then transforming the variable into a dichotomy using the mode as a threshold value 
would be considered, looking for a dependent variable transformed into a categorical variable. 
This situation would justify conducting an analysis with an ordered regression model such as 
ordinal logit that respects the dependent variable as an ordinal multimodal outcome (Long, 
1997). To take advantage of the implicit research design, a multilevel strategy, a given set of 
random prices (Level 1 unit) were collected by the same client, a surveyor in the field, (Level 
2 unit). The nesting (clustering) of prices within the same client made it more likely that the 
dependent variable would lack of independence, that is, that the prices would tend to be 
similar rather than to exhibit more variation. Multilevel modeling allowed appropriate 
addressing of one of the key questions of the research: whether the prices were correlated with 
the traits of the clients. It was possible to decompose what part of total variation observed in 
prices could be attributed to traits that corresponded to the taxi drivers or the characteristics of 
the unit and what part could be attributed to the traits of the surveyor. If the latter share of 
variation was statistically significant different from zero, the initial hypothesis on the role of 
client characteristics to set the price could be tested. In this context, fixed effects were the 
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proper model because the focus of the research was on the effects of the Level 2 units in the 
sample. If the Level 2 units were a sample of a larger universe, then the random coefficients 
would make sense, and the results could be generalized to such a population (Snijders & 
Bosker, 2012). The multilevel ordered regression analysis was implemented in Stata 14 using 
the command mixed effects ordinal logistic regression (meologit). 
The internal validity of the research was grounded taking into consideration the eight 
factors of Campbell and Stanley (1963): (a) during the experiment, care was taken that no 
special event influenced the results, (b) during the experiment, no psychological changes 
occurred within the subjects, (c) all testing of instruments was performed to different subjects 
having no direct influence on those members of the main sample, (d) all instruments were 
tested several times to ensure they would work well during the experiment, (e) internal 
validity related to statistical regression was ensured by identifying and excluding all abnormal 
cases, outliers, and influential observations, (f) the experiment was performed on 32 samples, 
the minimum number of samples possible taking into consideration the number of prototypes, 
and a 12-hour period of data gathering divided in three shifts limited the existence of a 
differential selection, (g) experimental mortality could be represented by the fact that a taxi 
driver would not agree to give a price for the journey (something difficult to control but 
unlikely to happen), and finally (h) the experiment was performed as naturally as possible in 
such a way that subjects would not influence each other. Regarding the reliability of the study, 
a split-half was performed, testing the significance of the Spearman-Brown coefficient. 
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Chapter 4: Presentation and Analysis of Data 
This chapter contains the presentation of the results of the analysis of the data gathered 
for the experimental study whose purpose was to test the theory of price discrimination by 
determining the customer characteristics taken into consideration by independent street taxi 
drivers (sellers), without price list or taximeter, when defining fares (initial prices) in the city 
of Lima, Peru. The main objective was understanding the price discrimination policy that 
exists in most markets in developing countries. This chapter is structured in the following 
order: (a) the data collection procedures, (b) the development of the experiment, (c) the pilot 
procedures, (d) the gathering of the data, (e) the setup of an analytical dataset, (f) the data 
diagnostics, (g) the modeling of price offer, and (h) conclusions. 
Data Collection Procedures 
Convenience sampling was used to choose a group of 10 taxi drivers who were 
interviewed with an interview guide. All the answers were recorded and then transcribed into 
a grid for the analysis. The main features identified that drivers took into account in 
determining an initial price were (a) demographic: sex and age, (b) ethno-racial markers: 
phenotype (physical complexion) and accent, and (c) external appearance: tidiness and attire. 
The levels for each factor found were (a) sex: female and male, (b) complexion: white and 
mestizo, (c) accent: Peruvian and foreign, (d) tidiness: neat and tacky, and (e) attire: formal 
and casual. The main features identified as vehicle characteristics were (a) color of the 
vehicle, (b) brand of the vehicle, and (c) year of the vehicle. With the customer variables 
identified, a fractional factorial design was run in Stata to find the fraction of all possible 





Characteristics of the 16 Prototypes of Client for the Experiment 
Prototype Sex Age Complexion Accent Tidiness Attire 
1 Female Elder (65+) Mestizo Peruvian Neat Formal 
2 Male Elder (65+) White Peruvian Tacky Casual 
3 Male Young (-18) Mestizo Foreign Tacky Formal 
4 Male Young (-18) Mestizo Peruvian Neat Casual 
5 Male Elder (65+) White Foreign Neat Formal 
6 Female Elder (65+) Mestizo Foreign Tacky Casual 
7 Male Young (-18) White Foreign Tacky Formal 
8 Female Adult (19-64) White Peruvian Neat Formal 
9 Male Adult (19-64) Mestizo Foreign Neat Formal 
10 Male Young (-18) White Peruvian Neat Casual 
11 Female Adult (19-64) White Foreign Tacky Casual 
12 Female Young (-18) White Peruvian Tacky Formal 
13 Female Young (-18) White Foreign Neat Casual 
14 Male Adult (19-64) Mestizo Peruvian Tacky Casual 
15 Female Young (-18) Mestizo Foreign Neat Casual 
16 Female Young (-18) Mestizo Peruvian Tacky Formal 
Development of the Experiment 
After identifying the set of prototypes to evaluate, interviewers were recruited and 
asked to respect the level of tidiness and attire of the prototype they had to represent. Next, a 
team of three supervisors was recruited, who were responsible for ensuring that the 
interviewers on their schedule respected the procedure and for assisting them if anything 
unexpected happened. The 16 interviewers were assigned shifts, as tabulated in Table 2, 
according to their availability and to avoid to repeating a schedule. Each prototype in both 
shifts was able to gather between 120 and 316 initial prices. Thus, they gathered a total of 
3538 observations in all (see Table 3). 
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Table 2 
Schedule of Data Gathering 
  Shift 1 Shift 2 
Prototype Day Schedule Day Schedule 
1 Sunday 12 08:00 to 12:00 Saturday 25 12:00 to 16:00 
2 Saturday 16 12:00 to 16:00 Sunday 17 16:00 to 20:00 
3 Saturday 6 16:00 to 20:00 Sunday 7 08:00 to 12:00 
4 Sunday 12 08:00 to 12:00 Saturday 25 12:00 to 16:00 
5 Saturday 6 12:00 to 16:00 Sunday 7 08:00 to 12:00 
6 Saturday 6 16:00 to 20:00 Sunday 7  08:00 to 12:00 
7 Saturday 11 08:00 to 12:00 Sunday 26 12:00 to 16:00 
8 Saturday 16 12:00 to 16:00 Sunday 17 16:00 to 20:00 
9 Sunday 12 12:00 to 16:00 Saturday 25 16:00 to 20:00 
10 Saturday 6 12:00 to 16:00 Sunday 7 16:00 to 20:00 
11 Saturday 11 08:00 to 12:00 Sunday 26 12:00 to 16:00 
12 Saturday 16 12:00 to 16:00 Sunday 17 08:00 to 12:00 
13 Saturday 16 16:00 to 20:00 Sunday 17 08:00 to 12:00 
14 Sunday 12 16:00 to 20:00 Saturday 25 08:00 to 12:00 
15 Saturday 11 16:00 to 20:00 Sunday 26 12:00 to 16:00 
16 Saturday 11 08:00 to 12:00 Sunday 26 16:00 to 20:00 
Pilot Procedures 
For the quality control stage, the interviewers were asked to submit a photograph that 
included their entire body. The background of the picture was removed and replaced with 
plain white. Then, a sample of drivers evaluated the prototype in each picture according to 
each of the six characteristics to determine how they perceived the prototype. The taxi drivers 
evaluated all the prototypes as expected, so there was consistency between the prototype and 
observation. 
Data Gathering 
In order to qualitatively identify the main features taken into account in determining 
an initial price, 10 interviews were conducted with taxi drivers. The interviews were recorded 
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using a digital recorder, and these recordings were transferred to a computer to be transcribed 
manually into an Excel grid for the analysis. 
In order to validate these variables and quantify their importance in the process of 
price discrimination, a field experiment was conducted in a natural environment, at the corner 
of Schell and Porta Streets in the district of Miraflores, Lima, Peru. In that location, a group 
of prototypes (people with a set of features, observing a fractional factorial design) stopped 
taxis and asked them the fare for a specific journey from the corner of Schell and Porta Streets 
to Larcomar, an important shopping mall a distance of 1.6 kilometers away. All asked for the 
same route and followed the following discourse in Spanish: Buenos días/tardes, ¿me podría 
decir cuánto me cobra hasta Larcomar? (Good morning/evening, could you tell me how 
much you charge to Larcomar?) This process was repeated several times throughout the 
schedule to gather the maximum sample for each customer prototype (see Table 3). All initial 
prices received and the vehicle characteristics (color, brand, and the number plate of the 
vehicle) were recorded on a paper questionnaire. In some cases, the number plate of the 
vehicle was missing due to an unreadable plate or because the taxi went off too fast; in both 
cases VACIO was registered in the corresponding field of the questionnaire. These 
questionnaires were typed in order to build an Excel database to perform appropriate 
statistical analyzes. 
Table 3 
Number of Initial Prices (Observation) Gathered by Prototype 
Prototype 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Total 
Observation 289 264 152 226 128 179 177 120 212 246 203 316 172 256 300 298 3538 
Analytical Dataset Setup 
The data gathered in questionnaires were transcribed into an Excel format, and the 
Excel file (“consolidado taxis (3).xlsx”) was imported into Stata version 14. A total of 3538 
observations were imported and read into a new raw dataset. Then, all string/character 
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variables were coded into a format suitable for analysis. Numeric variables were preserved. 
Most responses were recorded as text. To code them, first, the responses were grouped based 
similarity aiming to detect responses that differed only due to typographical errors or extra 
spaces. The variable shift, which reflects the schedule in which the collection was done, 
initially was coded into 10 categories to match the shift when data were collected. Based on 
the goals of the analysis, they were grouped further into 3 categories, morning (08:00 to 
12:00), midday-early afternoon (12:00 to 16:00) and evening (16:00 to 20:00). The variable 
year comes from the number plate registered in the questionnaire, with a search being made 
for each number plate in the public vehicle register (https://www.sat.gob.pe/Websitev9). 
Sometimes, when the car was too old, was newly bought, or came from outside Lima, it did 
not appear in the public vehicle register; in those cases, No se encuentra placa was registered 
in the data. When the year of the vehicle was blank or text-coded as No se encuentra placa 
(“a”) and VACIO (“b”), the data were treated as missing values. A sizeable part of the sample 
(47%) lacked a valid response in this item. For the variables color and brand, some categories 
were explicitly coded as VACIO with 135 and 134 cases. These cases were also coded with 
the same text in the variable year. The variable price, the key dependent variable showed a 
concentration in two categories, 5 and 6 Soles (~89% of the sample). One case (under 0.1% of 
the sample) showed a value of 35 Soles and was considered an outlier, more than two times 
higher than the standard deviation (SD). Mean value of price with the outlier case was 5.51 
Soles (SD=0.75, median=5.0). Mean value after removing the outlier was 5.50 (SD=0.75, 
median=5.0). After removing outlier cases, the analytical database had 3537 valid cases. 
Data Diagnostics 
After exploring the distribution of dependent and independent variables, they were 
tested for normality and for significance of differences between groups. The dependent 
variable (price offer) had the following characteristics. Responses of the dependent variable 
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(price) were highly concentrated in just two categories, 5 and 6 Soles, and represented 88.83% 
of the cases (see Table 4). Overlapping normal distribution in the histogram shows a huge 
deviation from a normal distribution, and quantile plots show divergence (see Figure 3). The 
conclusion was that the dependent variable was not normally distributed. A logarithmic 
transformation of the dependent variable does not solve the problem (see Figure 3). Despite 
the dependent variable being measured in an interval scale, it does not appear show two other 
properties: a true continuous and unbounded variable. Transforming the variable into a 
dichotomy using the mode as a threshold value was considered. It would lose variability, but 
it would allow estimating a less restrictive model without imposing normality assumptions. 
Descriptive statistics and distribution of predictors are presented in detailed results in 
Appendix B and C. 
Table 4 
Frequency Distribution of Dependent Variable, PRECIO (Initial Offer) 
Valid Freq. Percent Valid Cum. 
3 3 0.08 0.08 0.08 
4 87 2.46 2.46 2.54 
5 1955 55.27 55.27 57.82 
6 1187 33.56 33.56 91.38 
7 247 6.98 6.98 98.36 
8 54 1.53 1.53 99.89 
10 4 0.11 0.11 100.00 
Total 3537 100.00 100.00   
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Figure 3. Histogram, normal and empirical (kdensity) distribution Shapiro-Wilks test. 
The value of W is high but the p-value indicates rejection of the null hypothesis (H0) 
that values are normally distributed. There is evidence of non-normality in the data. A similar 
pattern is observed in the results of the Shapiro-Francia test (see Table 5). 
Table 5 
Results of Normality Tests 
Normality tests 
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
PRECIO 3537 0.97572 48.261 10.059 0.00000 
Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data 
Variable Obs W' V' z Prob>z 
PRECIO 3537 0.97543 52.087 9.803 0.00001 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for normality 
Variable Obs Pr(Skewness)  Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
PRECIO 3537 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 
Modeling of the Initial Price 
The initial model used is the ordinary least squares (OLS), due to the propriety that the 
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Kurkiewicz, 2013). For documentation purposes and to explore the relationship between 
predictors and independent variables, a regression was run on the price of the ride controlling 
by characteristics of the surveyor, time of the data collection, and characteristics of the 
vehicle. These results should be taken with caution and only as a referral due to the problems 
of non-normality detected. Then, an OLS regression was used with a common specification 
and 3 models: (a) classical OLS, (b) robust OLS to control for possible deviation of the data, 
and (c) clustered OLS to adjust for potential clustering effects due to the design of the project, 
that is, responses within the same surveyor tend to be correlated. Results show magnitude and 
direction of the relationship and, as expected, estimated coefficients did not change, but 
standard errors did because they are sensitive to the model specified (see Appendix E). Notice 
that the most restrictive model (OLS with clustered data) turned all the predictors into 
statistically not significant. Another important finding was that residuals analysis after 
controlling for different variables still exhibited a non-normal distribution, making the case 
for a different approach to model the relationship between the price and the predictors. 
Due to the lack of normality in the dependent variable reported in previous sections, a 
categorization of the responses in the dependent variable was necessary to transform it into a 
categorical variable (see Table 6 and Figure 4). One characteristic of the new categorical 
variable is that it retains its cardinal properties, that is, categories can be ranked from low to 
high except that one cannot determine the distances between adjacent categories. This 
situation justified conducting an analysis with an ordered regression model such as ordinal 







Distribution of Original and Recode Price Offer 
Panel A: Original price offer 
precio (PRECIO) 
Freq. Percent Valid Cum. 
Valid 3 3 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 4 87 2.46 2.46 2.54 
 5 1955 55.27 55.27 57.82 
 6 1187 33.56 33.56 91.38 
 7 247 6.98 6.98 98.36 
 8 54 1.53 1.53 99.89 
 10 4 0.11 0.11 100.00 
 Total 3537 100.00 100.00  
Panel B: Recoded price offer 
precio_cat -- RECODE of precio (PRECIO) 
   
Valid 1 <5 90 2.54 2.54 2.54 
 2  5 1955 55.27 55.27 57.82 
 3  6 1187 33.56 33.56 91.38 
 4  7+ 305 8.62 8.62 100.00 
 Total 3537 100.00 100.00  
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Figure 4. Distribution of price offers after recategorization. 
In a typical OLS model, it is assumed that responses collected are not biased because 
they are all within one level: for every price collected, the characteristics of the client are 
obtained, and the assumption is that such characteristics are independent of each other, but 
such a situation was not strictly true in this research. One possible solution is to ignore that 
such variation exists, but if the prices are in effect correlated with clients, it is always possible 
that coefficients associated with higher level unit of analysis characteristics might be unbiased 
and the standard errors underestimated, leading to spurious estimates. Another alternative 
solution is to collapse the Level 1 data to Level 2, ignoring the within-surveyors’ variation 
and then run a classical OLS model. The consequence is to lose variation and more likely to 
inflate the coefficients of the relationship and be trapped into an ecological fallacy, leading to 
the assumption that the relationships observed between higher level units are to be extended 
to lower level units. In this situation and to take advantage of the implicit research design of 
this project, a multilevel strategy, a given set of random prices (Level 1 unit) were collected 
by the same client, a surveyor in the field (Level 2 unit). The nesting (clustering) of prices 
within the same client makes it more likely that the dependent variable would lack 
independence, that is, that the prices tend to be similar rather than to exhibit more variation. 
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one appropriately to address one of the key questions of the research: whether the prices are 
correlated with the traits of the clients. It is possible to decompose what part of total variation 
observed in prices can be attributed to traits that correspond to the taxi drivers or the 
characteristics of the unit and what part can be attributed to the traits of the surveyor. If the 
latter share of variation is statistically significant different from zero, the initial hypothesis on 
the role of client characteristics in setting the price can be tested. Fixed effects are the proper 
model because the research was only interested in the effects of the Level 2 units in the 
sample. If the Level 2 units were a sample of a larger universe, then the random coefficients 
would make sense, and the results could be generalized to such population (Snijders & 
Bosker, 2012). The multilevel ordered regression analysis was implemented in Stata 14 using 
the command mixed effects ordinal logistic regression (meologit). Specification for the 
models is as follows: 
 Dependent variable 
 Categorized price offers 
 Independent variables: 3 blocks of variables distributed at 2 levels 
 Level 1: characteristics associated with the price offer  
 Vehicle characteristics 
 Color of the vehicle 
 Brand of the vehicle 
 Year of the vehicle 
 Data collection characteristics 
 Day of data collection 
 Shift of data collection 





 Ethno-racial markers 
 Phenotype (physical complexion) 
 Accent 
 External appearance 
 Tidiness 
 Attire 
First, we start with a simple (no levels) model for ordinal dependent variables with a 
single independent variable (Winship & Mare, 1984): 
  
∗ =   +     +    
where   
∗ is a latent variable ranging from -∞ to ∞,   is an observation, and    is a random 
error (with a standard logistic distribution, hence the ordered logit model). The measurement 
model is expanded to divide   
∗ into   ordinal categories: 
   =   if       ≤   
∗ <    for   = 1      
where τ  and τ    are cut-points or thresholds and need to be estimated. It is assumed 
that τ  = −∞ and τ  = ∞. Then, the notation is extended to accommodate a multilevel 
representation of a simple model, with the following equations for difference specifications 
(Guo & Zhao, 2000; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002 ): 
Model 0 is a null model used to estimate the intra-class correlation and comes from 
the combined model: 
   
∗ =    +    +     
where    
∗  is the outcome variable for the ith unit at Level 1 (vehicle and data collection) and 
jth unit at Level 2 (client);    is the grand intercept;     is a random effect accounting for the 
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random variable at Level 2 (note the term s    and     can be reexpressed as    ); and     is 





for ordinal logistic models, the   
  is assumed to be equal to   /3; hence the estimated 
variance at Level 2 is 0.08321 that indicates that there is a chance of 8% of finding 2 similar 
prices within each nested level unit (the higher the variance at this level, the more correlated 
are the responses in the nested level). 
Model 1 shows bivariate regression with each separate client (Level 2) characteristic 
without controls: 
   
∗ =    +      +    +     
where     is an individual explanatory variable that indicates a client characteristic. 
Model 2 shows multivariate regression with each separate client (Level 2) 
characteristic controlled by Level 1 characteristics: 
   
∗ =    +      +       +       +    +     
where       is a vector of characteristics of the vehicle (Level 1) and        is a vector of 
characteristics of the data collection process (Level 1). 
Model 3, multivariate regression, has all client (Level 2) and vehicle and data 
collection (Level 1) characteristics in a saturated model: 
   
∗ =    +      +       +       +    +     
where    is a vector of explanatory variables related to the client characteristics (Level 2). 
Findings 
Regarding the results of the multilevel ordinal logistic regression, Table 7 shows the 
standardized effects of the client’s characteristics on the independent variable (price offer 
categorized). Due to the dichotomous nature of the predictor variables, standardized 
coefficients were used to describe the findings, hence preserving the original unit of 
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measurement of the variables. An overall finding is that among the set of personal 
characteristics, those that might be proxies of ethnic and/or racial categories might have an 
influence on the price offer. Thus, only the phenotype (physical complexion) has a 
statistically significant effect on the price. A white client received a price offer between 0.36 
and 0.38 standard deviations higher than a mestizo client. This finding is consistent across the 
different models although, in Model 2, the level of significance is slightly under the 
conventional 95%. Another ethnic marker such as client’s accent has an influence in terms of 
increasing the price offer. Though the results are marginally significant, the effects of having 
a foreign accent ranges from .239 to .266 standard deviations, being significant only in Model 
3. Demographic traits such as sex and age exhibit a negative effect on the price offer. Thus, a 
female is more likely to receive a lower fare than a male (.22 to .23 SD, not significant). An 
increase in the age of the client also has a negative impact on price: in particular, for those in 
the 19-64 age group (.288 SD, only significant in Model 3). The remaining characteristics are 
related to personal image traits such as tidiness and attire. The effect of both characteristics is 
in opposite directions; a client with a less groomed style (tacky) is more likely to receive a 
higher price: the effects range from .13 to .16 standard deviations but are not statistically 
significant for any model. Finally, a client wearing more casual attire is more likely to receive 
a price offer that is lower than a client with more formal attire (work-related attire), but in all 





Standardized Effects of the Client’s Characteristics on the Price Offer  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Direct effect  
(no controls) 
Effect controlling by 
Level 1 
characteristics  
Effect controlling by 
Level 1 and Level 2 
characteristics 
 (b) (t) (b) (t) (b) (t) 
       
Panel A: Sex       
Male (reference category)       
Female -0.225 (-1.13) -0.236 (-1.16) -0.235 (-1.60) 
       
Panel B: Age       
Under 19 (reference category)       
19-64 -0.279 (-1.40) -0.283 (-1.38) -0.288+ (-1.90) 
65+ -0.162 (-0.79) -0.159 (-0.75) -0.164 (-1.06) 
       
Panel C: Complexion       
Mestizo (reference category)       
White 0.380* (2.08) 0.369+ (1.93) 0.362* (2.46) 
       
Panel D: Accent             
Peruvian (reference category)       
Foreigner 0.239 (1.22) 0.262 (1.31) 0.266+ (1.82) 
       
Panel E: Tidiness       
Neat (reference category)       
Tacky 0.132 (0.64) 0.161 (0.77) 0.160 (1.08) 
       
Panel F: Attire       
Formal (reference category)       
Casual -0.120 (-0.59) -0.096 (-0.46) -0.094 (-0.64) 
              
Controls       
Level 1 (characteristics of the 
vehicle and data collection) 
No Yes Yes 
Level 2 (client characteristics) No No Yes 
       
Observations 3537 3537 3537 
Note. Dependent variable is the ordinal categorization of price of the ride. Results are estimated using a mixed 
effects ordinal logistic regression. Effects are expressed as standardized coefficients. T statistics reported in 
parentheses. 
Significance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Figure 5. Effects of Level 2 characteristics on price offer based on bivariate regression 
models. 
Figure 6. Effects of Level 2 characteristics on price offer based on multivariate regression 
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Figure 7. Effects of Level 2 characteristics on price offer based on multivariate regression 
models controlling by Level 1 characteristics.  
Regarding the predicted effects of characteristics on price, we started by analyzing the 
role of the client’s phenotype (physical complexion). To help interpret the effect of the 
significant variable on the price offer, we estimate the change in the predicted probabilities 
due to a discrete change in the client’s physical traits: 
Pr(  =  | ) =  (   −   ) −  (     −   ) 
where  (. ) indicates the cumulative probability of cut-point   at outcomes 1 to J. Our 
predictor of interest is a dummy variable so the discrete change in the probability of observing 
a given price offer for a change of phenotype can be expressed as the change from the mestizo 
to the white category. The following equation expresses the discrete change while holding all 
other variables constant at their mean values: 
∆ Pr(  =  | ̅)
∆  
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where   indicates any outcome possible for the dependent variable  ;    and    indicate the 
start and end value of the predictor variable, in this case 1 and 0 respectively;    indicates the 
changes from     to   ; and  ̅ indicates the mean values of the other variables. 
The overall results are reported in Table 8 and showed in Figure 8: (a) a client with a 
mestizo complexion has a higher probability of receiving a lower price than a client with a 
white complexion; (b) a client with a mestizo complexion has a 50% higher probability of 
getting a price offer of less than 5 Soles in contrast with his white counterpart (3% vs. 2%); 
(c) at a higher price (5 Soles), such gap decreases, but it still favors mestizo clients: 60% of 
mestizo clients are likely to receive a price offer of 5 Soles, while among white clients, only 
50% get such price; (d) clients who receive a price offer of 6 Soles are more likely to be white 
than mestizo (probability of 38% vs. 30%); (e) and similarly, if a client gets a price offer of 7 
Soles or more, it is more likely that he has a white complexion (10% vs. 7%).  
Table 8 

























N 3537 3537 3537 3537 
Note. t statistics in parentheses. 




Figure 8. Predicted probability of price offer adjusted by completion (phenotype). 
Note. Vertical gray lines indicate the observed probability for each price offer (<5=.025; 5=.553; 6=.336; and 
7+= .086). 
Conclusions 
The conclusions regarding the research questions are as follows: 
1. Does discrimination in the initial price in a non-regulated taxi market exist?  
Discrimination exits, but it is limited. 
2. What are the characteristics of customers that sellers consider when defining the 
initial price offer? Phenotype (proxy for race/ethnicity) and accent (foreigner) have 
a significant effect on the initial price offer. 
3. Is there a significant relationship between external characteristics of customers and 
the price initially offered to them by sellers? A negative relationship was found for 
the phenotype (statistically significant) and a positive relationship for a foreign 



























The purpose of this chapter was to present the results of the analysis of the data 
gathered in the experimental study to test the theory of price discrimination by determining 
the customer characteristics taken into consideration by independent street taxi drivers 
(sellers), without price list, taximeter or mobile application, when defining fares (initial 
prices) in the city of Lima, Peru. The main objective was to understand the price 
discrimination policy that exists in most markets in developing countries. 
In the first stage of the research, 10 interviews were conducted to identify the main 
features taken into account in determining an initial price: (a) demographic: sex and age, (b) 
ethno-racial markers: phenotype (physical complexion) and accent, and (c) external 
appearance: tidiness and attire. The levels for each factor found were: (a) sex: female and 
male, (b) complexion: white and mestizo, (c) accent: Peruvian and foreign, (d) tidiness: neat 
and tacky, and (e) attire: formal and casual. The main features gathered for the vehicle 
characteristics were (a) color of the vehicle, (b) brand of the vehicle, and (c) year of the 
vehicle. With the customer variables identified, fractional factorial design in Stata was run 
which yielded 16 possible combinations of the factor levels that had to be represented by each 
of the prototypes of clients (interviewers). 
After identifying the set of prototypes to evaluate, interviewers were recruited and 
asked to respect the level of tidiness and attire of the prototype they had to represent. All the 
interviewers recruited were evaluated as the prototypes they had to represent so that there was 
consistency between the prototype and observation. During the experiment, each of the 
prototypes gathered between 120 and 316 initial prices, gathering a total of 3538 observations. 
These observations were obtained under particular circumstances: a controlled location, on 
weekends. 
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The data gathered in questionnaires were transcribed into an Excel format, then 
imported into Stata version 14. A total of 3538 observations were imported and read into a 
new raw dataset. Then all string/character variables were coded into a format suitable for 
analysis. Numeric variables were preserved. After removing outlier cases, the analytical 
database had 3537 valid cases. 
The distribution of dependent and independent variables was explored and the 
variables tested for normality and for significance of differences between groups. The 
dependent variable (price offer) was highly concentrated in just two categories (prices S/. 5 
and 6/. ; ~89% of the cases). This led to the conclusion that the dependent variable was not 
normally distributed. Due to the lack of normality, some of the responses were categorized in 
the dependent variable and transformed it into a categorical variable (<5, 5, 6, and >7), 
retaining its cardinal properties. 
This situation justified conducting an analysis with an ordered regression model such 
as ordinal logit that respects the dependent variable as an ordinal multimodal outcome. In a 
typical OLS model, the assumption was that responses collected are not biased because they 
are all within one level: for every price collected, the characteristics of the client were 
obtained and assumed to be independent of each other. Taking advantage of the implicit 
research design of this project, a multilevel strategy, a given set of random prices (Level 1 
unit) were collected by the same client, a surveyor in the field (Level 2 unit). The nesting 
(clustering) of prices within the same client made it more likely that the dependent variable 
would lack independence, that is, that the prices would tend to be similar rather than to exhibit 
more variation. This multilevel modeling allowed appropriately addressing one of the key 
questions of the research: whether the prices were correlated with the traits of the clients. It 
was possible to decompose what part of total variation observed in prices could be attributed 
to traits that corresponded to the taxi drivers or the characteristics of the unit and what part 
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could be attributed to the traits of the surveyor. With the latter share of variation statistically 
significant different from zero, the initial hypothesis on the role of client characteristics to set 
the price could be tested. The multilevel ordered regression analysis was implemented in Stata 
14 using the command mixed effects ordinal logistic regression (meologit). 
The test started with a simple (no levels) model for ordinal dependent variables with a 
single independent variable. A multilevel ordered regression analysis followed using three 
models: (a) Model 1, bivariate regression, with each separate client (Level 2) characteristic 
without controls; (b) Model 2, multivariate regression, with each separate client (Level 2) 
characteristic controlled by Level 1 characteristics; and (c) Model 3, multivariate regression, 
with all client (Level 2) and vehicle and data collection (Level 1) characteristics in a saturated 
model. 
Due to the dichotomous nature of the predictor variables, standardized coefficients 
were used to describe the findings, hence preserving the original unit of measurement of the 
variables. An overall finding is that among the set of personal characteristics, those that might 
be proxies of ethnic and/or racial categories might have an influence on the price offer. Thus, 
only the phenotype (physical complexion) had a statistically significant effect on the price. A 
white client received a price offer between 0.36 and 0.38 standard deviations higher than a 
mestizo client. Another ethnic marker, the client’s accent, had an influence in terms of 
increasing the price offer. A foreign accent ranges from .239 to .266 standard deviations, 
being significant only in Model 3. Demographic traits such as sex and age exhibited a 
negative effect on the price offer; a female was more likely to receive a lower fare than a male 
(.22 to .23 SD, not significant). An increase in the age of the client also had a negative effect 
on price: in particular, for those in the 19-64 age group (.288 SD, only significant in Model 3). 
The remaining characteristics are related to personal image traits such as tidiness and attire. 
The influence of both characteristics was in opposite directions. A client with a less groomed 
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style (tacky) was more likely to receive a higher price: the effects ranged from .13 to .16 
standard deviations, but they were not statistically significant for any model. Finally, a client 
wearing more casual attire was more likely to receive a price offer that was lower than a client 
with more formal attire (work-related attire), but in all cases, the statistical significance of the 
coefficients was under the conventional thresholds (under 90%). 
The analysis shows that a client with a mestizo complexion had a higher probability of 
receiving a lower price than a client with a white complexion: (a) a mestizo had a 50% higher 
probability of getting a price offer of less than 5 Soles in contrast with his white counterpart 
(3% vs. 2%), (b) 60% of mestizo clients were likely to receive a price offer of 5 Soles, while 
among white clients only 50% were offered such price, (c) clients who received a price offer 
of 6 Soles were more likely to be white than mestizo (probability of 38% vs .30%), and (d) if 
a client received a price offer of 7 Soles or more, it was more likely that he had a white 
complexion (10% vs. 7%). 
The findings regarding the research questions were that discrimination in the initial 
price in a non-regulated taxi market does exist, but it is limited, that phenotype (proxy for 
race/ethnicity) and accent (foreigner) have a significant effect on the initial offer price, and 
that a negative relationship exists for the phenotype (statistically significant) and a positive 
relationship exists for a foreigner accent (but marginally significant).  
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Chapter 5: Summary and Recommendations 
The problem that gave rise to this study was the lack of information regarding which 
variables are used and how they influence the definition of the initial price offered to a 
customer for products or services that do not have a defined tariff. Therefore, the purpose of 
this research was to test the theory of price discrimination and to show that price 
discrimination exists by identifying the variables of discrimination taken into consideration to 
define an initial price and how each variable affects the initial price given. Unlike other 
studies, in this case, the intention was to carry out an experimental study as close as possible 
to the natural context of the phenomenon. The experiment considered a group of 16 people, 
each of whom represented a set of defined characteristics: (a) sex: female and male, (b) 
complexion: white and mestizo, (c) accent: Peruvian and foreign, (d) tidiness: neat and tacky, 
and (e) attire: formal and casual. Each of these people proceeded to ask a sample of taxi 
drivers to offer a rate for the same destination from the same departure point. The data, 
composed of the set of characteristics and the prices of the initial offers, were analyzed to 
answer three research questions:  
1. Does discrimination in the initial price in a non-regulated taxi market exist? 
2. What are the characteristics of customers that sellers consider when defining the 
initial price offer? 
3. Is there a significant relationship between external characteristics of customers and 
the price initially offered to them by sellers? 
The main limitations of the research were that (a) it could only be done on weekends, 
(b) it was only feasible to analyze the taxi market, and (c) only the variation of prices for a 
single journey was analyzed. This chapter contains a detailed review of (a) the conclusions, 
(b) the implications, and (c) the recommendations resulting from the investigation. 
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Conclusions 
The experimental method used for this research, based on the manipulation of the 
characteristics of the potential customer of the taxi driver, proved a feasible and relatively 
simple mechanism to implement. This is of great importance because it has left evidence that 
it is possible to continue investigating a subject using techniques closer to the reality in which 
the phenomenon naturally occurs. In this case, it has been possible to measure the 
phenomenon in its natural environment: the street with individuals used to ask for taxi fares 
and expect deviations and independent taxi drivers that work without taximeters or 
established fares. This is important considering that, as Abdul-Muhmin (2001) indicated, 
much of the research in the field of price discrimination has been carried out under 
circumstances where price discrimination is not frequently present on a day-to-day basis. On 
the contrary, the great majority of studies have greater levels of internal validity than external. 
In addition, the productivity of the method was much higher than originally expected, 
obtaining a total of 3,538 observations (initial prices), more than double that expected. 
As for the quality of the data collected, the high concentration of the prices collected 
(89% were 5 or 6 Soles) limited the analysis to be made. This result implied that the data did 
not meet the normality assumptions, and in order to continue with the research objective, it 
was necessary to transform the dependent variable from continuous to categorical, with four 
levels: (a) less than 5 Soles, (b) 5 Soles, (c) 6 Soles, and (d) 7 or more Soles. This result led to 
the question what could be happening that led to this situation and, on the other hand, what 
could be done to avoid it. From the point of view of design, a path of greater distance between 
origin and destination could have been defined in such a way as to increase the possibility of a 
greater dispersion in prices. Although this was contemplated when choosing the route, a route 
was defined as long enough for dispersion but also short enough to control external factors to 
the study. In particular, it was important to avoid factors such as traffic, greater number of 
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possible routes, and the experience of the taxi driver, among others, influencing the initial 
price. Additionally, in countries where it is customary to use cash and credit cards are 
unusual, the phenomenon of the round currency exists. For example, in Peru, people usually 
deal with whole units of Soles and on very rare occasions use cents. Therefore, although it 
was possible that the initial prices could be in fractions of Soles, this did not happen; no taxi 
driver offered a price of 4 Soles and 30 cents or 5 Soles and 50 cents, for example. Finally, it 
is also possible that price discrimination is present within low dispersion margins to avoid 
being seen as abusive and also to avoid the fare becoming impractical, consequences that 
could lead to the loss of the marginal contribution that could be generated. 
Regarding the results of the analysis, it was found that discrimination in the initial 
price in a non-regulated taxi market exists and the set of individual characteristics that could 
be a proxy of ethnic or racial categories seemed to show a greater influence on the initial price 
offer. Thus, the phenotype (physical complexion) had a statistically significant effect on price. 
A white customer received a price offer between 0.36 and 0.38 standard deviations higher 
than a mestizo customer. Similarly, the accent of the client had an influence in terms of 
increasing the price offer. Although the results are marginally significant, the effects of 
having a foreign accent ranged from 0.239 to 0.266 standard deviations. These two 
characteristics are the only ones with a significant effect on the initial prices. 
On the other hand, other characteristics of the clients showed an effect in the expected 
direction but not reaching a level of significance high enough to assert that they should be 
considered in a price discrimination model for contexts such as the one studied. For example, 
demographic traits, such as sex, had a negative effect on price. A woman was more likely to 
receive a lower rate than a man (0.22 to 0.23 SD, not significant). The remaining features are 
related to personal image traits such as cleanliness and attire. The effect of both features was 
in opposite directions. A customer with a less formal (tacky) style was more likely to receive 
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a higher price: effects range from 0.13 to 0.16 standard deviations, but are not statistically 
significant for any model. Finally, it was more likely that a customer wearing more informal 
clothes would receive a lower price offer than a client with more formal attire (clothes related 
to work), but in any case, the statistical significance of the coefficients was found to be under 
the conventional threshold (less than 90%). 
Results indicate that all the characteristics of the clients evaluated are intended to be a 
proxy of the economic power of the person, some of them evidencing a significant 
relationship with the initial price offered by the seller. For some characteristics that could 
imply greater economic power, the direction of the relationship is in favor of higher prices, 
and for characteristics that tend to imply lower economic power, the direction is in favor of 
lower prices. 
Implications 
 From a cultural perspective, the price discrimination studied is evidenced as a natural 
phenomenon in economic transactions between people. This process of discrimination has 
existed for a long time (Pigou, 1920, Serrano, 1947) and is part of the empirical learning 
passed from one generation to another, which suggests the existence of favorable factors in its 
existence. This is of great importance and reinforces that price discrimination in the field of 
commercial transactions should be studied further, before it disappears, given the current 
trend where discrimination is seen as an abusive method, existing with the main purpose that 
bidders can take advantage of those demanding their products or services. This situation is 
magnified in a context where, with the purpose of providing facilities for the control and 
management of business processes, the use of fixed or tariff prices is increased as an 
alternative to pricing through empirical discrimination policies where prices are perceived as 
subjective and less auditable. 
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From a social perspective, price discrimination plays a very important economic role. 
Discrimination of the initial price seems to comply with a principle of social justice, 
suggesting that those who are able to pay more for a good or service do so in favor of those 
who cannot pay as much, achieving a balance between both parties and making possible the 
continuation of the system. As a result of the investigation, factors related to the purchasing 
power of people emerged as the ones with the greatest influence on the initial price that the 
drivers suggested. Foreigners, people with a European phenotype, or those with a foreign 
accent, all variables that in a context such as Peru are directly related to greater purchasing 
power (Quijano, 2007), usually received initial offers of a higher price. In this context, the 
idea that bidders take advantage of the price discrimination mechanism to abuse their position 
in order to obtain higher income is not entirely correct, given that the use of their position 
exists but, at the same time, allows balancing an economic system in which the respect of the 
demand is just as important as the subsistence of the offer. That is why there is natural 
discrimination with the purpose that the surplus achieved with a public can cover the deficit 
maintained with another public, achieving convenient results so that the offer can continue to 
exist, therefore fulfilling its role in the satisfaction of needs present in the demand. 
From an academic perspective, price discrimination is a poorly studied scheme 
compared to what corresponds to the management of fixed prices, which contradicts the 
rationale that the offer must adapt to the customer and not vice versa. The fixed price or tariff 
schemes are based largely on the logic of the company towards the customer. In many cases, 
prices are fixed based on variables linked to production costs and, in the best case, framed 
within economic accessibility ranges. On the other hand, in discriminated price schemes, 
prices are based on the characteristics of the client while the costs and the contribution to 
fixed costs only serve as an indicator of the lower limit to be respected for the viability of the 
transaction. 
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Additionally, from the academic point of view related to the research carried out 
within the framework of price discrimination, many writers focus on understanding the 
illegitimacy of the model, delving into the analysis of the injustice perceived by the consumer. 
Few have investigated the procedure and policies applied by the merchants to implement this 
pricing scheme that, as mentioned above, can represent one of the best alternatives for the 
survival of the offer, through the implementation of a cross subsidy scheme managed by the 
bidder: price discrimination. This leads to a proposal that, within the framework of price 
theory linked to discrimination, there should be a subdivision as regards the existing third 
degree discrimination types: on one hand, there should be a positive, fair, or pro-market 
discrimination, corresponding to this positive mechanism based on the cross-subsidy 
implemented through the definition of prices that may vary according to the economic 
possibilities of the customer. On the other hand, there should be a negative, abusive, or anti-
market discrimination, corresponding to mechanisms of price variation based on negative, 
hurtful factors, such as the establishment of prices based on gender, sexual orientation, or 
race, which have no purpose aligned with the improvement of commercial relationships 
leading to an improvement in the general quality of life. 
Finally, from a business management perspective, it is essential to evaluate the design 
and implementation of price discrimination mechanisms for business models as an 
opportunity to achieve part of the growth sought, identifying in this mechanism the tool that 
would allow them to enter into new markets. These could be markets with an insufficient 
number of potential clients capable of affording the actual standard price. In situations such as 
cities with important differences in the purchasing power of their population, a scheme based 
on price discrimination would allow having an offer that suits or approaches the ability to pay 
of a larger number of people. This opportunity is only viable if the implementation of price 
discrimination mechanisms is accompanied by education and awareness campaigns that price 
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discrimination could be favorable, protecting the seller from any reputational crisis due to the 
actual perception that price discrimination is an abusive mechanism. Discrimination schemes 
must support both supply and demand so that the offer can reach a greater number of people 
requesting the product or service necessary to cover their needs and therefore increase their 
quality of life. 
This investigation has shown that, in the non-regulated taxi market, price 
discrimination exists and occurs naturally in commercial relationships that are not framed by 
an offer with fixed prices or subject to tariffs and that this discrimination is modeled 
according to characteristics of those making the demand that seem to be linked to their 
economic capacity. All these elements are of great value in the framework of continuing to 
enrich the knowledge of the community of scientists and management professionals. This 
research opens the way to continue understanding the mechanism of price discrimination in 
other services or products and to continue to study them in other locations with wide 
differences in the purchasing power of their population. Researchers could seek a greater 
understanding of which physical characteristics of those who demand a service influence the 
price and of the magnitude of their influence, as well as whether it changes according to the 
service, product, or location. Such investigations would certainly reinforce the idea that price 
discrimination is favorable for the economic development of companies and for the 
contribution of a greater number of products and services to currently inaccessible 
populations. Finally, in order to improve the image of price discrimination in the framework 
of better business management, it would be relevant to coin a specific concept for price 
discrimination in favor of a market based on fair relationships. 
Recommendations 
The research carried out for this study represents an additional step in a subject of 
study that could be useful in the near future. Although price discrimination has been limited 
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or prohibited with the aim of improving commercial management, price discrimination can be 
very useful if it is well understood and carefully applied using the correct variables and 
affecting the price to the correct extent. 
Furthermore, this research shows that price discrimination seems to be unconsciously 
accepted as fair, or at least its marginal impact on prices does not seem to merit an effort by 
the population to fight against it; rather it could be seen as an egalitarian mechanism of 
opportunity. It is for this reason that what has been identified in the market of taxi drivers in 
Lima should be studied for more categories and in a greater number of locations with the 
purpose of constructing more robust, practical, effective, and accepted models of price 
discrimination. Further studies, such as: a) to study the characteristics of the offer (product or 
service) needed for a feasible and beneficial price discrimination. b) To study the 
characteristics of the demand (target market) needed for a feasible and beneficial price 
discrimination. c) To study the characteristics of the distribution channels to identify in which 
of them price discrimination is feasible and beneficial. d) To study which rules (code of 
ethics) should be respected in a price discrimination mechanism so that it is perceived as 
positive and has consequences in favor of market development. e) To study what should be 
the characteristics that must be met in advertisement, so that the promotion of products or 
services sold with discriminated prices is within the framework of the law, is economically 
feasible for companies and does not generate a rejection from the target market. Finally, f) to 
study what should be the internal characteristics of a company so that it is feasible to 
implement a mechanism of beneficial price discrimination. Future steps in this field of 
research could be very helpful to an increasing number of companies that are constantly 
accumulating more information about their customers with the clear purpose of using it to 
achieve higher sales by adapting their offerings to them. For example, it could especially be 
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helpful for data scientists in the construction of models for loyalty programs with discounts or 
models for e-commerce with discriminated price offers.  
In particular, this research confirms that price discrimination is real and leaves for 
further research the understanding of why it exists. A plausible explanation is that it is a 
necessary mechanism of cross-subsidy between customers, managed by the supplier, 
providing marginally greater access to the demand, and allowing greater volumes of sales for 
the supplier. With regard to this last point, it would be useful to understand further the direct 
and indirect, conscious and unconscious benefits of this differentiated pricing mechanism in 
order to understand the factors that need to be taken into consideration for the acceptance of a 
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. . . . . .. . . Appendix A: Interview Guide  
 
                    Guía de Entrevistas 
Taxistas 
I. Introducción 
Buenos días, mi nombre es ____________ y estoy participando del recojo de información 
para un trabajo de investigación doctoral. Esta investigación es sobre los hábitos y rutas de 
taxis, por lo que le pediría que pudiera brindarme 15 minutos de su tiempo para realizar una 
pequeña entrevista. Toda la información que nos dé va a ser estrictamente confidencial. 
Recuerde que no hay respuestas correctas ni incorrectas. 
II. Hábitos y rutinas 
1. Presentación: ¿Cómo es su día a día, su rutina diaria? ¿En qué horarios suele trabajar? 
¿Difiere en los días normales y los fines de semana?  
2. Rutas usuales: Ahora me gustaría saber ¿suele tener rutas usuales en su trabajo? (E: 
indagar si va a todos los destinos o solo circula por ciertos distritos). 
 
III. Variaciones en el precio 
3. Horarios: Y cuénteme, ¿usted suele variar sus tarifas en base a algún indicador? Por 
ejemplo, respecto a los horarios. ¿En qué horarios considera que las tarifas deben 
incrementarse? ¿A qué se debe esto? Y, por el contrario, ¿en qué horarios considera que 
las tarifas deben ser menores? ¿A qué se debe esto? 
4. Punto de partida y destino: Y así como hay horarios en los que las tarifas se incrementan, 
¿pasa lo mismo con las rutas? ¿cómo así? (E: indagar si el punto de origen o de destino 
impactan en la fijación de precios, p.e. taxistas que incrementan su tarifa porque no 
desean ir a ciertos lugares). 
5. Características del pasajero: ¿Usted considera que hay taxistas que fijan sus precios en 
base a las características de los pasajeros? ¿Por qué cree que se da esto? Y, ¿cuáles son 
las características que hacen que le cobren más a unos que a otros? (E: enumerar las 
características una a una y profundizar en cuáles incrementan el precio y cuáles 
mantienen/bajan el precio, p.e. Sexo, Edad, Vestimenta, Tono de piel). 
6. Otras categorías: Ahora que ya hemos determinado que en esta categoría “taxis” no hay 
precios fijos, sino que se van definiendo en base a varios factores, ¿considera que existen 




Appendix B: Descriptive statistics and distribution of dependent and predictor variables 
Descriptive Statistics: Price Offer (dependent variable) 
      .  fre precio 
       
      precio -- PRECIO 
      ----------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |      Freq.    Percent      Valid       Cum. 
      --------------+-------------------------------------------- 
      Valid   3     |          3       0.08       0.08       0.08 
              4     |         87       2.46       2.46       2.54 
              5     |       1955      55.27      55.27      57.82 
              6     |       1187      33.56      33.56      91.38 
              7     |        247       6.98       6.98      98.36 
              8     |         54       1.53       1.53      99.89 
              10    |          4       0.11       0.11     100.00 
              Total |       3537     100.00     100.00            
      ----------------------------------------------------------- 
       
      . fsum precio, stat(mean sd min max p50) 
       
       Variable |        N     Mean       SD   Median      Min      Max                                                          
      ----------+------------------------------------------------------ 
         precio |     3537     5.50     0.75     5.00     3.00    10.00   
       
       
Descriptive Statistics by predictors: client characteristics 
      .  foreach var of varlist c_fsexo c_fedad c_ftez c_facento c_fimagen c_fvestimenta { 
      .         table `var' , c(mean precio sd precio n precio ) format(%7.2f) 
      . } 
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
            Sex | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
           Male |         5.54          0.72         1,660 
         Female |         5.47          0.77         1,877 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
            Age | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
       Under 19 |         5.57          0.80         1,886 
          19-64 |         5.41          0.72           791 
            65+ |         5.42          0.63           860 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
      Phenotype | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
        Mestizo |         5.41          0.67         1,911 
          White |         5.61          0.82         1,626 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
         Accent | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
       Peruvian |         5.46          0.74         2,015 
      Foreigner |         5.56          0.75         1,522 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
      Appearanc | 
      e         | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
           Neat |         5.45          0.66         1,693 
          Tacky |         5.55          0.82         1,844 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
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         Attire | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
         Formal |         5.52          0.80         1,691 
         Casual |         5.48          0.70         1,846 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
Descriptive Statistics by predictors: vehicle characteristics 
      .  fre taxi_color taxi_marca taxi_anho 
       
      taxi_color -- Vehicle color 
      -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                             |      Freq.    Percent      Valid       Cum. 
      -----------------------+-------------------------------------------- 
      Valid   1  Yellow      |        311       8.79       8.79       8.79 
              3  Blue        |        165       4.66       4.66      13.46 
              4  Beige       |         74       2.09       2.09      15.55 
              5  White       |        710      20.07      20.07      35.62 
              8  Gray        |        395      11.17      11.17      46.79 
              12 Black       |        644      18.21      18.21      65.00 
              13 Silver      |        545      15.41      15.41      80.41 
              15 Red         |        268       7.58       7.58      87.98 
              17 Green       |         79       2.23       2.23      90.22 
              88 Other color |         81       2.29       2.29      92.51 
              90 No data     |        265       7.49       7.49     100.00 
              Total          |       3537     100.00     100.00            
      -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       
      taxi_marca -- Vehicle brand 
      -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                             |      Freq.    Percent      Valid       Cum. 
      -----------------------+-------------------------------------------- 
      Valid   3  BYD         |         43       1.22       1.22       1.22 
              4  CHEVROLET   |        252       7.12       7.12       8.34 
              5  DAEWOO      |         56       1.58       1.58       9.92 
              11 HONDA       |         29       0.82       0.82      10.74 
              12 HYUNDAI     |        327       9.25       9.25      19.99 
              15 KIA         |        333       9.41       9.41      29.40 
              17 MAZDA       |         42       1.19       1.19      30.59 
              19 MITSUBISHI  |         49       1.39       1.39      31.98 
              20 NISSAN      |        914      25.84      25.84      57.82 
              21 RENAULT     |         22       0.62       0.62      58.44 
              23 SUZUKI      |         37       1.05       1.05      59.49 
              24 TOYOTA      |        853      24.12      24.12      83.60 
              25 VOLKSWAGEN  |         97       2.74       2.74      86.34 
              88 Other brand |        224       6.33       6.33      92.68 
              90 No data     |        259       7.32       7.32     100.00 
              Total          |       3537     100.00     100.00            
      -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       
      taxi_anho -- Vehicle year 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           |      Freq.    Percent      Valid       Cum. 
      ---------------------+-------------------------------------------- 
      Valid   0    No data |       1694      47.89      47.89      47.89 
              2010 2010    |        146       4.13       4.13      52.02 
              2011 2011    |        309       8.74       8.74      60.76 
              2012 2012    |        272       7.69       7.69      68.45 
              2013 2013    |        278       7.86       7.86      76.31 
              2014 2014    |        246       6.96       6.96      83.26 
              2015 2015    |        307       8.68       8.68      91.94 
              2016 2016    |        285       8.06       8.06     100.00 
              Total        |       3537     100.00     100.00            
      ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Descriptive Statistics by predictors: data collection characteristics 
      .  fre c_dÍadeobservac c_horario c_horariogr 
       
      c_dÍadeobservac -- Day of data collection 
      ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                         |      Freq.    Percent      Valid       Cum. 
      -------------------+-------------------------------------------- 
      Valid   1 Saturday |       2045      57.82      57.82      57.82 
              2 Sunday   |       1492      42.18      42.18     100.00 
              Total      |       3537     100.00     100.00            
      ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       
      c_horario 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                |      Freq.    Percent      Valid       Cum. 
      --------------------------+-------------------------------------------- 
      Valid   101 08:00 - 12:00 |        734      20.75      20.75      20.75 
              102 08:15 - 12:00 |        192       5.43       5.43      26.18 
              103 08:15 - 12:15 |        184       5.20       5.20      31.38 
              201 12:00 - 16:00 |        911      25.76      25.76      57.14 
              202 12:30 - 16:30 |        120       3.39       3.39      60.53 
              203 14:00 - 16:00 |        120       3.39       3.39      63.92 
              301 16:00 - 20:00 |       1105      31.24      31.24      95.17 
              302 16:30 - 20:00 |        120       3.39       3.39      98.56 
              303 16:50 - 20:00 |          3       0.08       0.08      98.64 
              304 15:00 - 20:00 |         48       1.36       1.36     100.00 
              Total             |       3537     100.00     100.00            
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       
      c_horariogr -- Shift of data collection 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                        |      Freq.    Percent      Valid       Cum. 
      ----------------------------------+-------------------------------------------- 
      Valid   100 Morning (08-12)       |       1110      31.38      31.38      31.38 
              200 Mid-afternoon (12-16) |       1151      32.54      32.54      63.92 
              300 Afternoon (16-20)     |       1276      36.08      36.08     100.00 
              Total                     |       3537     100.00     100.00            
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
  
  84
Appendix C: Descriptive statistics of prices against independent (predictors) variables 
Characteristics of the client 
Sex 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
            Sex | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
           Male |         5.54          0.72         1,660 
         Female |         5.47          0.77         1,877 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
       
      Test of differences: Male vs Female 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      precio             0.0696**        (2.77) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    3537                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
       
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
            Age | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
       Under 19 |         5.57          0.80         1,886 
          19-64 |         5.41          0.72           791 
            65+ |         5.42          0.63           860 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
 
Age 
       
      Test of differences: Under 19 vs 19-64 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      precio              0.158***       (4.80) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    2677                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
       
       
      Test of differences: 19-64 vs 65+ 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      precio           -0.00627         (-0.19) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    1651                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
       
       
      Test of differences: Under 19 vs 65+ 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
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      precio              0.152***       (4.91) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    2746                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
 
Phenotype 
       
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
      Phenotype | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
        Mestizo |         5.41          0.67         1,911 
          White |         5.61          0.82         1,626 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
       
      Test of differences: Mestizo vs White 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      precio             -0.198***      (-7.94) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    3537                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
 
Accent 
       
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
         Accent | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
       Peruvian |         5.46          0.74         2,015 
      Foreigner |         5.56          0.75         1,522 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
       
      Test of differences: Peruvian vs Foreigner 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      precio             -0.103***      (-4.07) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    3537                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
 
Appareance 
       
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
      Appearanc | 
      e         | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
           Neat |         5.45          0.66         1,693 
          Tacky |         5.55          0.82         1,844 
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      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
       
      Test of differences: Neat vs Tacky 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      precio            -0.0932***      (-3.71) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    3537                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
 
Attire 
       
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
         Attire | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
         Formal |         5.52          0.80         1,691 
         Casual |         5.48          0.70         1,846 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
       
      Test of differences: Formal vs Casual 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      precio             0.0462          (1.84) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    3537                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
       
Vehicle characteristics 
Vehicle color 
      ------------------------------------------------------ 
      Vehicle     | 
      color       | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ------------+----------------------------------------- 
           Yellow |         5.52          0.78           311 
             Blue |         5.47          0.70           165 
            Beige |         5.49          0.62            74 
            White |         5.46          0.70           710 
             Gray |         5.49          0.72           395 
            Black |         5.50          0.77           644 
           Silver |         5.54          0.77           545 
              Red |         5.52          0.70           268 
            Green |         5.49          0.83            79 
      Other color |         5.53          0.71            81 
          No data |         5.52          0.84           265 
      ------------------------------------------------------ 





       
      ------------------------------------------------------ 
      Vehicle     | 
      brand       | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ------------+----------------------------------------- 
              BYD |         5.37          0.66            43 
        CHEVROLET |         5.49          0.75           252 
           DAEWOO |         5.43          0.68            56 
            HONDA |         5.55          0.78            29 
          HYUNDAI |         5.46          0.77           327 
              KIA |         5.57          0.81           333 
            MAZDA |         5.45          0.67            42 
       MITSUBISHI |         5.47          0.62            49 
           NISSAN |         5.48          0.71           914 
          RENAULT |         5.50          0.96            22 
           SUZUKI |         5.49          0.77            37 
           TOYOTA |         5.53          0.76           853 
       VOLKSWAGEN |         5.54          0.68            97 
      Other brand |         5.47          0.68           224 
          No data |         5.52          0.85           259 
      ------------------------------------------------------ 
       
 
Vehicle year 
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
      Vehicle   | 
      year      | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
        No data |         5.48          0.75         1,694 
           2010 |         5.49          0.68           146 
           2011 |         5.48          0.69           309 
           2012 |         5.51          0.77           272 
           2013 |         5.48          0.73           278 
           2014 |         5.55          0.73           246 
           2015 |         5.50          0.75           307 
           2016 |         5.59          0.84           285 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
Data collection characteristics 
Day of data collection 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
      Day of    | 
      data      | 
      collectio | 
      n         | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
       Saturday |         5.54          0.79         2,045 
         Sunday |         5.45          0.67         1,492 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
       
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
      Day of    | 
      data      | 
      collectio | 
      n         | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------+----------------------------------------- 
       Saturday |         5.54          0.79         2,045 
         Sunday |         5.45          0.67         1,492 
      ---------------------------------------------------- 
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      Test of differences: Saturday vs Sunday 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      precio             0.0865***       (3.41) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    3537                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
 
Shift of data collection 
       
      -------------------------------------------------------- 
          c_horario | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      --------------+----------------------------------------- 
      08:00 - 12:00 |         5.52          0.79           734 
      08:15 - 12:00 |         5.65          0.87           192 
      08:15 - 12:15 |         5.22          0.52           184 
      12:00 - 16:00 |         5.53          0.81           911 
      12:30 - 16:30 |         5.47          0.62           120 
      14:00 - 16:00 |         5.57          0.78           120 
      16:00 - 20:00 |         5.54          0.70         1,105 
      16:30 - 20:00 |         5.10          0.30           120 
      16:50 - 20:00 |         5.00          0.00             3 
      15:00 - 20:00 |         5.21          0.46            48 
      -------------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
      ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Shift of data         | 
      collection            | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------------------+----------------------------------------- 
            Morning (08-12) |         5.49          0.78         1,110 
      Mid-afternoon (12-16) |         5.53          0.79         1,151 
          Afternoon (16-20) |         5.49          0.68         1,276 
      ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
       
      ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Shift of data         | 
      collection            | mean(precio)    sd(precio)     N(precio) 
      ----------------------+----------------------------------------- 
            Morning (08-12) |         5.49          0.78         1,110 
      Mid-afternoon (12-16) |         5.53          0.79         1,151 
          Afternoon (16-20) |         5.49          0.68         1,276 
      ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       
       
       
      Test of differences: Morning (08-12) vs Mid-afternoon (12-16) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      precio            -0.0364         (-1.11) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    2261                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
       




      Test of differences: Mid-afternoon (12-16) vs Afternoon (16-20) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      precio             0.0382          (1.28) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    2427                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
       
       
      Test of differences: Morning (08-12) vs Afternoon (16-20) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
                          diff.                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      precio            0.00173          (0.06) 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      N                    2386                 
      ----------------------------------------- 
      t statistics in parentheses 
      * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       




Appendix D: Normality of residuals after applying a OLS regression model with 
clustered standard errors 
 
Standardized normal probability plot of residuals 
 
 






























0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
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Appendix E: Exploratory linear regression analysis 
Regression of price of taxi ride controlling by surveyor characteristics, time of data 
collection, and characteristics of the vehicle 
                         Null Model         OLS         OLS Robust    OLS Clustered 
                             (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
Saturday                                        0               0               0    
                                              (.)             (.)             (.)    
Sunday                                    -0.0634*        -0.0634*        -0.0634    
                                          (-2.32)         (-2.39)         (-0.96)    
Morning (08-12)                                 0               0               0    
                                              (.)             (.)             (.)    
Mid-afternoon (1~16)                       0.0277          0.0277          0.0277    
                                           (0.82)          (0.79)          (0.37)    
Afternoon (16-20)                         0.00284         0.00284         0.00284    
                                           (0.09)          (0.09)          (0.03)    
Male                                            0               0               0    
                                              (.)             (.)             (.)    
Female                                     -0.106***       -0.106***       -0.106    
                                          (-4.05)         (-4.01)         (-1.51)    
Under 19                                        0               0               0    
                                              (.)             (.)             (.)    
19-64                                      -0.170***       -0.170***       -0.170    
                                          (-5.23)         (-5.37)         (-1.84)    
65+                                        -0.134***       -0.134***       -0.134    
                                          (-4.33)         (-4.77)         (-2.06)    
Mestizo                                         0               0               0    
                                              (.)             (.)             (.)    
White                                       0.172***        0.172***        0.172*   
                                           (6.60)          (6.72)          (2.16)    
Peruvian                                        0               0               0    
                                              (.)             (.)             (.)    
Foreigner                                   0.131***        0.131***        0.131    
                                           (5.03)          (5.15)          (2.10)    
Neat                                            0               0               0    
                                              (.)             (.)             (.)    
Tacky                                      0.0883***       0.0883***       0.0883    
                                           (3.37)          (3.54)          (1.29)    
Formal                                          0               0               0    
                                              (.)             (.)             (.)    
Casual                                    -0.0513*        -0.0513*        -0.0513    
                                          (-1.98)         (-2.09)         (-0.75)    
 
Constant                    5.500***        5.408***        5.408***        5.408*** 
                         (437.79)         (41.60)         (44.96)         (67.74)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
N                            3537            3537            3537            3537    
r2_a                            0          0.0371          0.0371          0.0371    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Appendix F: Unstandardized effects of the client’s characteristics on the price offered  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Direct effect  
(no controls) 
Effect controlling by level 1 
characteristics  
Effect controlling by level 1 and 
level 2 characteristics 
  (b) (t) (b) (t) (b) (t) 
     
Panel A: Sex         
Male (reference category)     
Female -0.310 (-1.13) -0.326 (-1.16) -0.324 (-1.60) 
      
Panel B: Age           
Under 19 (reference category)      
19-64 -0.461 (-1.40) -0.467 (-1.38) -0.475 (-1.90) 
65+ -0.259 (-0.79) -0.254 (-0.75) -0.263 (-1.06) 
       
Panel C: Complexion             
Mestizo (reference category)       
White 0.524* (2.08) 0.509+ (1.93) 0.499* (2.46) 
       
Panel D: Accent             
Peruvian (reference category)       
Foreigner 0.332 (1.22) 0.365 (1.31) 0.369+ (1.82) 
       
Panel E: Tidyness             
Neat (reference category)       
Tacky 0.181 (0.64) 0.221 (0.77) 0.220 (1.08) 
       
Panel F: Attire             
Formal (reference category)       
Casual -0.165 (-0.59) -0.132 (-0.46) -0.130 (-0.64) 
              
Controls       
Level 1 (characteristics of the 
vehicle and data collection) 
No Yes Yes 
Level 2 (client characteristics) No No Yes 
     
Observations 3537 3537 3537 
Notes: Dependent variable is the ordinal categorization of price of the ride. Coefficients estimated using a mixed 
effect ordinal logistic regression. Effects expressed in logit units. T statistics reported in parentheses 




Appendix G: Results of multilevel ordinal logistic regressions using variables only at 
level 1 
 
Estimation using level 1 predictors 
Characteristics of the taxi/vehicle 
*color of the vehicle: taxi_color 
*brand of the vehicle: taxi_marca 
*year of the vehicle //notice ~45% missing year: taxi_anho 
Characteristics of date and time of observation 
*day of observation (2 days): c_dÍadeobservac 
*time (recoded into 3 shifts) of observation: c_horariogr 
 
Level 1 predictors, bivariate models 
Level 1 predictor variable: taxi_color Vehicle color  
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3530.7636   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3530.7632   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood =  -3432.368 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -3432.368  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3430.0002  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -3428.328   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3425.3472   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3425.3369   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3425.3369   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(10)     =       4.58 
      Log likelihood = -3425.3369                     Prob > chi2       =     0.9176 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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         precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    | 
         taxi_color | 
              Blue  |  -.0844015   .1915236    -0.44   0.659    -.4597809    .2909779 
             Beige  |  -.0155895   .2545144    -0.06   0.951    -.5144285    .4832494 
             White  |  -.1325203   .1362858    -0.97   0.331    -.3996356    .1345951 
              Gray  |  -.0708287   .1513507    -0.47   0.640    -.3674706    .2258132 
             Black  |  -.0116134   .1383612    -0.08   0.933    -.2827965    .2595696 
            Silver  |   .0634761   .1414741     0.45   0.654    -.2138082    .3407603 
               Red  |  -.0065184   .1654141    -0.04   0.969    -.3307241    .3176874 
             Green  |  -.0826679   .2592004    -0.32   0.750    -.5906913    .4253555 
       Other color  |   .1752106   .2461273     0.71   0.477    -.3071901    .6576113 
           No data  |  -.0675577   .1682917    -0.40   0.688    -.3974034    .2622881 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
              /cut1 |  -3.863992   .2073207   -18.64   0.000    -4.270333   -3.457651 
              /cut2 |   .2656596    .179821     1.48   0.140    -.0867831    .6181022 
              /cut3 |   2.409058   .1866151    12.91   0.000     2.043299    2.774817 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador  | 
          var(_cons)|   .3061185   .1156317                      .1460026    .6418276 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 210.85        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 4.58 | degrees of freedom: 10 | p-value: 0.92 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(10) =      4.57 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_taxi_color)           Prob > chi2 =    0.9178 
       
       
Level 1 predictor variable: taxi_marca Vehicle brand  
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3528.4589   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3528.4571   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3528.4571   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3430.9225 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3430.9225  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3428.5547  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3426.8535   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3423.7693   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -3423.759   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -3423.759   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 




                                                      Wald chi2(14)     =       7.70 
      Log likelihood =  -3423.759                     Prob > chi2       =     0.9045 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    | 
         taxi_marca | 
         CHEVROLET  |   .2692156   .3353769     0.80   0.422    -.3881111    .9265424 
            DAEWOO  |   .0267051   .4136877     0.06   0.949    -.7841078     .837518 
             HONDA  |   .1837676   .4792312     0.38   0.701    -.7555084    1.123044 
           HYUNDAI  |   .1043929   .3310018     0.32   0.752    -.5443586    .7531445 
               KIA  |   .4189453   .3295734     1.27   0.204    -.2270068    1.064897 
             MAZDA  |   .1424656   .4387114     0.32   0.745    -.7173931    1.002324 
        MITSUBISHI  |   .3346914   .4164853     0.80   0.422    -.4816048    1.150988 
            NISSAN  |   .2417399   .3180463     0.76   0.447    -.3816194    .8650992 
           RENAULT  |    .239794   .5453868     0.44   0.660    -.8291444    1.308732 
            SUZUKI  |   .1765907   .4580458     0.39   0.700    -.7211626    1.074344 
            TOYOTA  |   .3415528   .3187547     1.07   0.284    -.2831949    .9663005 
        VOLKSWAGEN  |   .3661461   .3676105     1.00   0.319    -.3543572    1.086649 
       Other brand  |   .2360135   .3382326     0.70   0.485    -.4269102    .8989372 
           No data  |   .2261746   .3358536     0.67   0.501    -.4320863    .8844354 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
              /cut1 |   -3.56463   .3551186   -10.04   0.000     -4.26065    -2.86861 
              /cut2 |   .5661334   .3408576     1.66   0.097    -.1019352    1.234202 
              /cut3 |   2.711329   .3449377     7.86   0.000     2.035263    3.387394 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador  | 
          var(_cons)|   .3051933   .1153245                      .1455219    .6400612 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 209.40        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 7.70 | degrees of freedom: 14 | p-value: 0.90 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(14) =      7.73 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_taxi_marca)           Prob > chi2 =    0.9029 
       
       
Level 1 predictor variable: taxi_anho Vehicle year  
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3530.4082   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3530.4076   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3530.4076   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood =  -3431.308 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -3431.308  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3428.9428  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3427.3137   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3424.5244   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3424.5147   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3424.5147   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
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      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(7)      =       6.25 
      Log likelihood = -3424.5147                     Prob > chi2       =     0.5104 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   | 
         taxi_anho | 
             2010  |   .0679638    .169671     0.40   0.689    -.2645852    .4005128 
             2011  |   .0295876   .1228305     0.24   0.810    -.2111558    .2703311 
             2012  |    .068612   .1307071     0.52   0.600    -.1875691    .3247932 
             2013  |  -.0189941   .1303824    -0.15   0.884    -.2745389    .2365507 
             2014  |    .186974   .1331269     1.40   0.160      -.07395    .4478979 
             2015  |   .0760422   .1234543     0.62   0.538    -.1659237    .3180082 
             2016  |   .2703596   .1269213     2.13   0.033     .0215984    .5191208 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             /cut1 |  -3.779315   .1795158   -21.05   0.000    -4.131159    -3.42747 
             /cut2 |   .3504765   .1475354     2.38   0.018     .0613124    .6396406 
             /cut3 |   2.495185   .1559582    16.00   0.000     2.189512    2.800857 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador | 
         var(_cons)|    .307335   .1160668                      .1466057    .6442777 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 211.79        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 6.25 | degrees of freedom: 7 | p-value: 0.51 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(7)  =      6.22 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_taxi_anho)            Prob > chi2 =    0.5145 
       
       
Level 1 predictor variable: c_dÍadeobservac Day of data collection 
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3529.7036   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3529.7031   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3529.7031   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3432.4683 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3432.4683  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3430.0968  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3428.3761   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3425.6735   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -3425.664   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -3425.664   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(1)      =       3.91 
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      Log likelihood =  -3425.664                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0479 
      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      ----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      | 
      c_dÍadeobservac | 
              Sunday  |  -.1413981    .071469    -1.98   0.048    -.2814747   -.0013214 
      ----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                /cut1 |  -3.890482   .1784428   -21.80   0.000    -4.240223    -3.54074 
                /cut2 |   .2378317   .1454495     1.64   0.102     -.047244    .5229075 
                /cut3 |   2.381543    .153546    15.51   0.000     2.080598    2.682488 
      ----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador    | 
            var(_cons)|   .3020786   .1141903                      .1439968    .6337049 
      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 208.08        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 3.91 | degrees of freedom: 1 | p-value: 0.05 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      3.92 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_c_dÍadeobs~c)         Prob > chi2 =    0.0477 
       
       
Level 1 predictor variable: c_horariogr Shift of data collection  
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3531.4873   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3531.4871   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3431.0097 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3431.0097  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3428.6493  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3427.0433   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3422.6699   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3422.6546   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3422.6546   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(2)      =       9.90 
      Log likelihood = -3422.6546                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0071 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                              | 
                  c_horariogr | 
       Mid-afternoon (12-16)  |   .2965707   .0945828     3.14   0.002     .1111918    .4819495 
           Afternoon (16-20)  |   .1885246   .1023127     1.84   0.065    -.0120047    .3890539 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        /cut1 |  -3.674113     .18701   -19.65   0.000    -4.040646   -3.307581 
                        /cut2 |   .4609196   .1575844     2.92   0.003     .1520599    .7697792 
                        /cut3 |   2.606477   .1658924    15.71   0.000     2.281334     2.93162 
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      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador            | 
                    var(_cons)|   .3215344   .1214448                      .1533647    .6741084 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 217.67        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 9.90 | degrees of freedom: 2 | p-value: 0.01 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =      9.94 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_c_horariogr)          Prob > chi2 =    0.0069 
       
       
__82502300 
__ i.taxi_color i.taxi_marca i.taxi_anho i.c_dÍadeobservac i.c_horariogr 
Level 1 predictors (full model) 
Level 1 all predictor variables: taxi_color taxi_marca taxi_anho c_dÍadeobservac 
c_hor ariogr .  
meologit precio_cat $L1_list || c_observador:, 
      Fitting fixed-effects model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3518.8046   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3518.7932   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3518.7932   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3421.2006 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3421.2006  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -3418.844  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3417.1054   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3411.6739   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3411.6578   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3411.6578   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(34)     =      31.74 
      Log likelihood = -3411.6578                     Prob > chi2       =     0.5791 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                              | 
                   taxi_color | 
                        Blue  |  -.1088401   .1969873    -0.55   0.581    -.4949281     .277248 
                       Beige  |  -.0595859   .2588706    -0.23   0.818     -.566963    .4477912 
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                       White  |  -.1583387    .139661    -1.13   0.257    -.4320692    .1153919 
                        Gray  |  -.1422276   .1576222    -0.90   0.367    -.4511614    .1667063 
                       Black  |  -.0722203   .1464911    -0.49   0.622    -.3593376     .214897 
                      Silver  |   .0354097   .1461653     0.24   0.809    -.2510689    .3218884 
                         Red  |  -.0258221   .1695313    -0.15   0.879    -.3580974    .3064531 
                       Green  |   -.102001   .2637486    -0.39   0.699    -.6189387    .4149368 
                 Other color  |   .1705732   .2494718     0.68   0.494    -.3183826     .659529 
                     No data  |   .2232924   .7586232     0.29   0.768    -1.263582    1.710167 
                              | 
                   taxi_marca | 
                   CHEVROLET  |   .2910729    .338908     0.86   0.390    -.3731746    .9553205 
                      DAEWOO  |   .0417839   .4248939     0.10   0.922    -.7909928    .8745606 
                       HONDA  |   .1207322   .4866667     0.25   0.804    -.8331169    1.074581 
                     HYUNDAI  |   .0553614   .3342317     0.17   0.868    -.5997207    .7104435 
                         KIA  |   .4083106    .332837     1.23   0.220     -.244038    1.060659 
                       MAZDA  |   .1687051   .4451964     0.38   0.705    -.7038639    1.041274 
                  MITSUBISHI  |   .3980309   .4238251     0.94   0.348     -.432651    1.228713 
                      NISSAN  |    .234335   .3222035     0.73   0.467    -.3971722    .8658423 
                     RENAULT  |   .2075322   .5476415     0.38   0.705    -.8658254     1.28089 
                      SUZUKI  |   .1430628    .463807     0.31   0.758    -.7659822    1.052108 
                      TOYOTA  |    .350519   .3227219     1.09   0.277    -.2820043    .9830424 
                  VOLKSWAGEN  |    .386635   .3717838     1.04   0.298    -.3420478    1.115318 
                 Other brand  |    .220389   .3429627     0.64   0.520    -.4518055    .8925836 
                     No data  |  -.0312564   .8226859    -0.04   0.970    -1.643691    1.581178 
                              | 
                    taxi_anho | 
                        2010  |   .0305074   .1750613     0.17   0.862    -.3126065    .3736213 
                        2011  |    .015601   .1286668     0.12   0.903    -.2365814    .2677833 
                        2012  |   .0912868   .1358665     0.67   0.502    -.1750066    .3575802 
                        2013  |  -.0502736   .1344472    -0.37   0.708    -.3137853    .2132382 
                        2014  |   .2185206    .137482     1.59   0.112    -.0509391    .4879804 
                        2015  |   .0845313   .1311105     0.64   0.519    -.1724407    .3415032 
                        2016  |   .2886914   .1345329     2.15   0.032     .0250117    .5523711 
                              | 
              c_dÍadeobservac | 
                      Sunday  |   -.094907   .0746395    -1.27   0.204    -.2411977    .0513838 
                              | 
                  c_horariogr | 
       Mid-afternoon (12-16)  |   .2703832   .0988898     2.73   0.006     .0765627    .4642036 
           Afternoon (16-20)  |    .182691   .1037254     1.76   0.078     -.020607     .385989 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        /cut1 |  -3.487428   .3896347    -8.95   0.000    -4.251098   -2.723758 
                        /cut2 |   .6604647   .3769788     1.75   0.080    -.0784002     1.39933 
                        /cut3 |   2.815657   .3808577     7.39   0.000      2.06919    3.562125 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador            | 
                    var(_cons)|   .3220203   .1217465                      .1534859    .6756128 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 214.27        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 31.74 | degrees of freedom: 34 | p-value: 0.58 
      .         lrtest m_all_L1 m_null  
       
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(34) =     31.93 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_all_L1)               Prob > chi2 =    0.5693 
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Appendix H: Results of multilevel ordinal logistic regressions using variables only at 
level 2 
Estimation using level-2 covariates 
Level 2 predictor variable, no controls: c_fsexo Sex  
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3527.5892   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3527.5878   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3527.5878   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3433.9281 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3433.9281  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3431.5364  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3429.5729   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3427.0302   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3427.0087   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3427.0086   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(1)      =       1.27 
      Log likelihood = -3427.0086                     Prob > chi2       =     0.2589 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   | 
           c_fsexo | 
           Female  |  -.3097231   .2743564    -1.13   0.259    -.8474518    .2280056 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             /cut1 |  -3.981325   .2203613   -18.07   0.000    -4.413225   -3.549425 
             /cut2 |     .14471    .194291     0.74   0.456    -.2360933    .5255133 
             /cut3 |   2.286587   .2001403    11.42   0.000     1.894319    2.678855 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador | 
         var(_cons)|   .2820197   .1067502                      .1343019    .5922111 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 201.16        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 1.27 | degrees of freedom: 1 | p-value: 0.26 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      1.23 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_c_fsexo)              Prob > chi2 =    0.2674 
      variable m_c_fsexo not found 
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Level 2 predictor variable, controlling by level 1 variables: m_c_fsexo   
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -3511.099   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3511.0738   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3511.0738   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3422.0004 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3422.0004  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3419.6202  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3417.5259   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3411.1754   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -3411.014   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3411.0119   
      Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -3411.0119   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(35)     =      33.00 
      Log likelihood = -3411.0119                     Prob > chi2       =     0.5652 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                              | 
                      c_fsexo | 
                      Female  |  -.3258649   .2812686    -1.16   0.247    -.8771411    .2254114 
                              | 
                   taxi_color | 
                        Blue  |   -.107064    .196988    -0.54   0.587    -.4931534    .2790255 
                       Beige  |  -.0590718   .2588603    -0.23   0.819    -.5664285     .448285 
                       White  |   -.158629   .1396599    -1.14   0.256    -.4323573    .1150993 
                        Gray  |   -.141532   .1576203    -0.90   0.369    -.4504621    .1673981 
                       Black  |  -.0718337   .1464881    -0.49   0.624    -.3589451    .2152777 
                      Silver  |   .0353007   .1461678     0.24   0.809    -.2511829    .3217843 
                         Red  |  -.0257604   .1695397    -0.15   0.879    -.3580521    .3065314 
                       Green  |  -.1016819   .2637627    -0.39   0.700    -.6186473    .4152835 
                 Other color  |   .1702383   .2494527     0.68   0.495      -.31868    .6591566 
                     No data  |   .2250386   .7586325     0.30   0.767    -1.261854    1.711931 
                              | 
                   taxi_marca | 
                   CHEVROLET  |   .2915743   .3388771     0.86   0.390    -.3726127    .9557613 
                      DAEWOO  |   .0439736   .4249094     0.10   0.918    -.7888336    .8767807 
                       HONDA  |   .1212505    .486664     0.25   0.803    -.8325934    1.075095 
                     HYUNDAI  |   .0557368   .3342055     0.17   0.868    -.5992939    .7107676 
                         KIA  |   .4089955   .3328077     1.23   0.219    -.2432955    1.061286 
                       MAZDA  |   .1692473   .4452374     0.38   0.704     -.703402    1.041897 
                  MITSUBISHI  |   .3993735    .423804     0.94   0.346     -.431267    1.230014 
                      NISSAN  |   .2347716   .3221723     0.73   0.466    -.3966745    .8662178 
                     RENAULT  |   .2110258   .5476308     0.39   0.700    -.8623109    1.284363 
                      SUZUKI  |   .1438279   .4637641     0.31   0.756    -.7651331    1.052789 
                      TOYOTA  |   .3510495   .3226898     1.09   0.277    -.2814108    .9835099 
                  VOLKSWAGEN  |   .3873755   .3717604     1.04   0.297    -.3412614    1.116012 
                 Other brand  |   .2212463   .3429296     0.65   0.519    -.4508834    .8933761 
                     No data  |   -.031404    .822679    -0.04   0.970    -1.643825    1.581017 
                              | 
                    taxi_anho | 
                        2010  |   .0337351   .1750837     0.19   0.847    -.3094226    .3768929 
                        2011  |   .0154699   .1286618     0.12   0.904    -.2367027    .2676424 
                        2012  |   .0916049   .1358666     0.67   0.500    -.1746886    .3578985 
                        2013  |  -.0504091   .1344427    -0.37   0.708     -.313912    .2130938 
                        2014  |   .2176759   .1374847     1.58   0.113    -.0517892    .4871411 
                        2015  |   .0835516   .1311081     0.64   0.524    -.1734156    .3405189 
                        2016  |   .2885609   .1345241     2.15   0.032     .0248985    .5522234 
                              | 
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              c_dÍadeobservac | 
                      Sunday  |  -.1001302   .0747856    -1.34   0.181    -.2467072    .0464469 
                              | 
                  c_horariogr | 
       Mid-afternoon (12-16)  |   .2670953   .0988833     2.70   0.007     .0732875    .4609031 
           Afternoon (16-20)  |   .1813593   .1036277     1.75   0.080    -.0217473    .3844659 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        /cut1 |  -3.652972   .4130671    -8.84   0.000    -4.462569   -2.843375 
                        /cut2 |   .4945419   .4008209     1.23   0.217    -.2910527    1.280136 
                        /cut3 |   2.649828   .4042176     6.56   0.000     1.857576     3.44208 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador            | 
                    var(_cons)|   .2960367   .1123009                      .1407486    .6226546 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 200.12        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 33.00 | degrees of freedom: 35 | p-value: 0.57 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(34) =     31.99 
      (Assumption: m_c_fsexo nested in m_c_fsexo_L1)        Prob > chi2 =    0.5663 
       
       
 
Level 2 predictor variable, no controls: c_fedad Age  
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3513.5356   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3513.5156   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3513.5156   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3433.2379 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3433.2379  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3430.8335  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3428.7622   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3426.7956   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3426.6431   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3426.6423   
      Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -3426.6423   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(2)      =       2.09 
      Log likelihood = -3426.6423                     Prob > chi2       =     0.3520 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   | 
           c_fedad | 
            19-64  |  -.4611942   .3286851    -1.40   0.161    -1.105405    .1830167 
              65+  |  -.2589914   .3275939    -0.79   0.429    -.9010637    .3830809 
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      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             /cut1 |  -4.006233   .2163681   -18.52   0.000    -4.430306   -3.582159 
             /cut2 |   .1208225   .1889861     0.64   0.523    -.2495834    .4912284 
             /cut3 |   2.262366   .1951212    11.59   0.000     1.879936    2.644797 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador | 
         var(_cons)|   .2674803    .101974                      .1267011    .5646809 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 173.75        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 2.09 | degrees of freedom: 2 | p-value: 0.35 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =      1.96 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_c_fedad)              Prob > chi2 =    0.3748 
      variable m_c_fedad not found 
       
       
 
Level 2 predictor variable, controlling by level 1 variables: m_c_fedad   
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3500.0697   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3500.0102   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3500.0102   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3420.0373 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3420.0373  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -3417.648  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3415.5369   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3410.9904   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3410.7198   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3410.7157   
      Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -3410.7157   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(36)     =      33.62 
      Log likelihood = -3410.7157                     Prob > chi2       =     0.5825 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                              | 
                      c_fedad | 
                       19-64  |  -.4666156   .3383647    -1.38   0.168    -1.129798     .196567 
                         65+  |  -.2542155   .3373993    -0.75   0.451     -.915506     .407075 
                              | 
                   taxi_color | 
                        Blue  |   -.108833   .1969859    -0.55   0.581    -.4949181    .2772522 
                       Beige  |  -.0600528   .2588877    -0.23   0.817    -.5674633    .4473578 
                       White  |  -.1575022   .1396567    -1.13   0.259    -.4312242    .1162199 
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                        Gray  |  -.1420909   .1576125    -0.90   0.367    -.4510057    .1668239 
                       Black  |  -.0714948   .1464851    -0.49   0.626    -.3586002    .2156106 
                      Silver  |   .0352641   .1461594     0.24   0.809     -.251203    .3217312 
                         Red  |  -.0257455   .1695202    -0.15   0.879    -.3579989    .3065079 
                       Green  |  -.1009832   .2637034    -0.38   0.702    -.6178324    .4158661 
                 Other color  |   .1684833   .2494393     0.68   0.499    -.3204086    .6573753 
                     No data  |    .231611   .7586967     0.31   0.760    -1.255407    1.718629 
                              | 
                   taxi_marca | 
                   CHEVROLET  |   .2889695   .3389303     0.85   0.394    -.3753217    .9532608 
                      DAEWOO  |   .0399809   .4248655     0.09   0.925    -.7927401    .8727019 
                       HONDA  |   .1211722   .4866684     0.25   0.803    -.8326804    1.075025 
                     HYUNDAI  |   .0526192   .3342505     0.16   0.875    -.6024997    .7077382 
                         KIA  |   .4060015   .3328558     1.22   0.223    -.2463839    1.058387 
                       MAZDA  |   .1657892   .4452218     0.37   0.710    -.7068295    1.038408 
                  MITSUBISHI  |   .3945443   .4238511     0.93   0.352    -.4361885    1.225277 
                      NISSAN  |   .2327847   .3222195     0.72   0.470     -.398754    .8643234 
                     RENAULT  |   .2037758   .5476892     0.37   0.710    -.8696753    1.277227 
                      SUZUKI  |   .1438651    .463839     0.31   0.756    -.7652425    1.052973 
                      TOYOTA  |   .3482022   .3227373     1.08   0.281    -.2843514    .9807557 
                  VOLKSWAGEN  |   .3860531   .3717761     1.04   0.299    -.3426146    1.114721 
                 Other brand  |   .2197846   .3429714     0.64   0.522     -.452427    .8919962 
                     No data  |  -.0397053   .8227473    -0.05   0.962     -1.65226     1.57285 
                              | 
                    taxi_anho | 
                        2010  |   .0291513   .1750653     0.17   0.868    -.3139703    .3722729 
                        2011  |   .0160905   .1286638     0.13   0.900    -.2360859    .2682669 
                        2012  |   .0896244   .1358789     0.66   0.510    -.1766934    .3559423 
                        2013  |  -.0515951   .1344462    -0.38   0.701    -.3151048    .2119145 
                        2014  |    .218162    .137485     1.59   0.113    -.0513037    .4876277 
                        2015  |    .085344   .1311237     0.65   0.515    -.1716538    .3423418 
                        2016  |   .2887248   .1345372     2.15   0.032     .0250367    .5524129 
                              | 
              c_dÍadeobservac | 
                      Sunday  |  -.0914809   .0746443    -1.23   0.220    -.2377811    .0548193 
                              | 
                  c_horariogr | 
       Mid-afternoon (12-16)  |   .2731502   .0987998     2.76   0.006     .0795061    .4667942 
           Afternoon (16-20)  |     .17894   .1036408     1.73   0.084    -.0241922    .3820722 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        /cut1 |   -3.66772    .410928    -8.93   0.000    -4.473124   -2.862316 
                        /cut2 |    .480802   .3982506     1.21   0.227    -.2997549    1.261359 
                        /cut3 |   2.635777   .4017456     6.56   0.000     1.848371    3.423184 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador            | 
                    var(_cons)|   .2837253   .1082203                      .1343468    .5991957 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 178.59        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 33.62 | degrees of freedom: 36 | p-value: 0.58 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(34) =     31.85 
      (Assumption: m_c_fedad nested in m_c_fedad_L1)        Prob > chi2 =    0.5732 
       
       
 
Level 2 predictor variable, no controls: c_ftez Phenotype  
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3502.8895   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3502.8458   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3502.8458   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3432.6229 
       
      Fitting full model: 
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      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3432.6229  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3427.4263   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3425.8406   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3425.7192   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3425.7188   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3425.7188   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(1)      =       4.31 
      Log likelihood = -3425.7188                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0378 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   | 
            c_ftez | 
            White  |   .5239237   .2522914     2.08   0.038     .0294416    1.018406 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             /cut1 |  -3.566099   .2044529   -17.44   0.000    -3.966819   -3.165379 
             /cut2 |   .5599797   .1782411     3.14   0.002     .2106336    .9093258 
             /cut3 |   2.702041   .1859758    14.53   0.000     2.337535    3.066547 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador | 
         var(_cons)|   .2354375   .0908112                      .1105494    .5014121 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 154.25        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 4.31 | degrees of freedom: 1 | p-value: 0.04 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      3.81 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_c_ftez)               Prob > chi2 =    0.0510 
      variable m_c_ftez not found 
       
       
 
Level 2 predictor variable, controlling by level 1 variables: m_c_ftez   
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3488.5487   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3488.4429   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3488.4429   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood =  -3421.401 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -3421.401  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3416.1756   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3410.7485   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3409.9877   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3409.9811   
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      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3409.9811   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(35)     =      35.23 
      Log likelihood = -3409.9811                     Prob > chi2       =     0.4572 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                              | 
                       c_ftez | 
                       White  |   .5087603   .2629431     1.93   0.053    -.0065987    1.024119 
                              | 
                   taxi_color | 
                        Blue  |  -.1118056    .196982    -0.57   0.570    -.4978831     .274272 
                       Beige  |  -.0609607   .2588769    -0.24   0.814      -.56835    .4464287 
                       White  |  -.1612554   .1396773    -1.15   0.248    -.4350178     .112507 
                        Gray  |  -.1437951    .157624    -0.91   0.362    -.4527325    .1651422 
                       Black  |  -.0734868   .1464975    -0.50   0.616    -.3606166     .213643 
                      Silver  |   .0337952   .1461694     0.23   0.817    -.2526916     .320282 
                         Red  |  -.0278159    .169545    -0.16   0.870     -.360118    .3044862 
                       Green  |  -.1034863   .2637235    -0.39   0.695    -.6203749    .4134024 
                 Other color  |   .1702936   .2494276     0.68   0.495    -.3185754    .6591627 
                     No data  |   .2106933   .7584615     0.28   0.781    -1.275864     1.69725 
                              | 
                   taxi_marca | 
                   CHEVROLET  |   .2883198   .3389273     0.85   0.395    -.3759655     .952605 
                      DAEWOO  |   .0341834   .4248728     0.08   0.936    -.7985519    .8669187 
                       HONDA  |   .1236284   .4866424     0.25   0.799    -.8301731     1.07743 
                     HYUNDAI  |   .0527213    .334254     0.16   0.875    -.6024045    .7078471 
                         KIA  |   .4060167   .3328601     1.22   0.223     -.246377     1.05841 
                       MAZDA  |   .1722593   .4451887     0.39   0.699    -.7002946    1.044813 
                  MITSUBISHI  |   .3913355   .4238112     0.92   0.356    -.4393191     1.22199 
                      NISSAN  |   .2328063   .3222265     0.72   0.470    -.3987461    .8643587 
                     RENAULT  |   .2043549   .5474795     0.37   0.709    -.8686852    1.277395 
                      SUZUKI  |   .1387498    .463788     0.30   0.765     -.770258    1.047758 
                      TOYOTA  |   .3484115   .3227437     1.08   0.280    -.2841546    .9809776 
                  VOLKSWAGEN  |    .381954   .3717885     1.03   0.304    -.3467381    1.110646 
                 Other brand  |   .2191255   .3429817     0.64   0.523    -.4531063    .8913573 
                     No data  |  -.0241175   .8225004    -0.03   0.977    -1.636189    1.587954 
                              | 
                    taxi_anho | 
                        2010  |   .0298616    .175026     0.17   0.865    -.3131831    .3729063 
                        2011  |   .0169974    .128674     0.13   0.895     -.235199    .2691939 
                        2012  |   .0917812   .1358758     0.68   0.499    -.1745305    .3580929 
                        2013  |  -.0490767   .1344242    -0.37   0.715    -.3125434      .21439 
                        2014  |   .2202845   .1374562     1.60   0.109    -.0491247    .4896937 
                        2015  |   .0853256    .131111     0.65   0.515    -.1716473    .3422986 
                        2016  |   .2870505   .1345146     2.13   0.033     .0234067    .5506942 
                              | 
              c_dÍadeobservac | 
                      Sunday  |  -.0976114   .0746024    -1.31   0.191    -.2438294    .0486066 
                              | 
                  c_horariogr | 
       Mid-afternoon (12-16)  |   .2598974   .0990298     2.62   0.009     .0658027    .4539922 
           Afternoon (16-20)  |   .1823827   .1033681     1.76   0.078     -.020215    .3849804 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        /cut1 |  -3.242377     .40454    -8.01   0.000    -4.035261   -2.449493 
                        /cut2 |   .9051405    .393037     2.30   0.021     .1348023    1.675479 
                        /cut3 |   3.060596    .397163     7.71   0.000     2.282171    3.839022 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador            | 
                    var(_cons)|   .2559396   .0986851                      .1202074    .5449336 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 156.92        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
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Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 35.23 | degrees of freedom: 35 | p-value: 0.46 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(34) =     31.48 
      (Assumption: m_c_ftez nested in m_c_ftez_L1)          Prob > chi2 =    0.5920 
       
       
 
Level 2 predictor variable, no controls: c_facento Accent  
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3524.9138   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3524.9107   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3524.9107   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3433.7904 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3433.7904  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3431.3946  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3429.3929   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3426.9467   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3426.9143   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3426.9142   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(1)      =       1.48 
      Log likelihood = -3426.9142                     Prob > chi2       =     0.2238 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   | 
         c_facento | 
        Foreigner  |    .331679   .2726338     1.22   0.224    -.2026735    .8660315 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             /cut1 |  -3.662052   .2173854   -16.85   0.000     -4.08812   -3.235985 
             /cut2 |   .4645032   .1925893     2.41   0.016     .0870351    .8419712 
             /cut3 |   2.606304   .1994245    13.07   0.000     2.215439    2.997169 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador | 
         var(_cons)|   .2782338   .1054921                      .1323359    .5849816 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 195.99        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
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Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 1.48 | degrees of freedom: 1 | p-value: 0.22 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      1.42 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_c_facento)            Prob > chi2 =    0.2336 
      variable m_c_facento not found 
       
       
 
Level 2 predictor variable, controlling by level 1 variables: m_c_facento   
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3510.0059   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3509.9772   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3509.9772   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3420.1505 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3420.1505  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3417.7664  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3415.7039   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3410.9284   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3410.8426   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3410.8414   
      Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -3410.8414   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(35)     =      33.36 
      Log likelihood = -3410.8414                     Prob > chi2       =     0.5476 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                              | 
                    c_facento | 
                   Foreigner  |   .3645158   .2784166     1.31   0.190    -.1811708    .9102024 
                              | 
                   taxi_color | 
                        Blue  |   -.109532   .1969619    -0.56   0.578    -.4955703    .2765062 
                       Beige  |  -.0591378    .258856    -0.23   0.819    -.5664863    .4482107 
                       White  |  -.1567838   .1396555    -1.12   0.262    -.4305036     .116936 
                        Gray  |  -.1418615   .1576145    -0.90   0.368    -.4507803    .1670572 
                       Black  |  -.0721955   .1464799    -0.49   0.622    -.3592909    .2148999 
                      Silver  |   .0357619    .146155     0.24   0.807    -.2506966    .3222204 
                         Red  |  -.0261624   .1695127    -0.15   0.877    -.3584011    .3060764 
                       Green  |  -.1017856   .2637241    -0.39   0.700    -.6186754    .4151042 
                 Other color  |     .16977   .2494775     0.68   0.496    -.3191969     .658737 
                     No data  |   .2265989   .7586627     0.30   0.765    -1.260353    1.713551 
                              | 
                   taxi_marca | 
                   CHEVROLET  |    .291801   .3388804     0.86   0.389    -.3723924    .9559944 
                      DAEWOO  |   .0416661     .42483     0.10   0.922    -.7909854    .8743175 
                       HONDA  |   .1188468   .4866629     0.24   0.807     -.834995    1.072689 
                     HYUNDAI  |   .0557018   .3342041     0.17   0.868    -.5993262    .7107297 
                         KIA  |   .4089163   .3328133     1.23   0.219    -.2433857    1.061218 
                       MAZDA  |    .166861    .445175     0.37   0.708    -.7056658    1.039388 
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                  MITSUBISHI  |   .3997839   .4238082     0.94   0.346     -.430865    1.230433 
                      NISSAN  |   .2336623   .3221774     0.73   0.468    -.3977937    .8651184 
                     RENAULT  |   .2059331   .5476504     0.38   0.707     -.867442    1.279308 
                      SUZUKI  |   .1444976   .4637957     0.31   0.755    -.7645253     1.05352 
                      TOYOTA  |   .3507772   .3226977     1.09   0.277    -.2816987     .983253 
                  VOLKSWAGEN  |   .3864188   .3717606     1.04   0.299    -.3422186    1.115056 
                 Other brand  |   .2193162   .3429383     0.64   0.522    -.4528306     .891463 
                     No data  |  -.0344347   .8227153    -0.04   0.967    -1.646927    1.578058 
                              | 
                    taxi_anho | 
                        2010  |   .0301388   .1750365     0.17   0.863    -.3129265    .3732041 
                        2011  |   .0158345   .1286661     0.12   0.902    -.2363465    .2680155 
                        2012  |   .0916908   .1358559     0.67   0.500    -.1745819    .3579634 
                        2013  |  -.0512043   .1344367    -0.38   0.703    -.3146954    .2122868 
                        2014  |    .218062   .1374789     1.59   0.113    -.0513917    .4875157 
                        2015  |   .0849346   .1311104     0.65   0.517     -.172037    .3419063 
                        2016  |   .2894139   .1345265     2.15   0.031     .0257468    .5530811 
                              | 
              c_dÍadeobservac | 
                      Sunday  |  -.0924156   .0746144    -1.24   0.216    -.2386571    .0538259 
                              | 
                  c_horariogr | 
       Mid-afternoon (12-16)  |   .2757414   .0988685     2.79   0.005     .0819627      .46952 
           Afternoon (16-20)  |   .1808223   .1035806     1.75   0.081    -.0221918    .3838365 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        /cut1 |  -3.304017   .4114891    -8.03   0.000    -4.110521   -2.497513 
                        /cut2 |   .8441483    .400106     2.11   0.035     .0599549    1.628342 
                        /cut3 |   2.999289   .4040007     7.42   0.000     2.207463    3.791116 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador            | 
                    var(_cons)|   .2894913   .1099239                      .1375379    .6093246 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 198.27        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 33.36 | degrees of freedom: 35 | p-value: 0.55 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(34) =     32.15 
      (Assumption: m_c_facento nested in m_c_facento_L1)    Prob > chi2 =    0.5587 
       
       
 
Level 2 predictor variable, no controls: c_fimagen Appearance  
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3529.3919   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3529.3912   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3529.3912   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3434.0908 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3434.0908  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3431.7128  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -3429.929   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3427.4271   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3427.4184   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3427.4184   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
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                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(1)      =       0.42 
      Log likelihood = -3427.4184                     Prob > chi2       =     0.5191 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   | 
         c_fimagen | 
            Tacky  |   .1812066   .2810545     0.64   0.519      -.36965    .7320633 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             /cut1 |  -3.735884   .2238916   -16.69   0.000    -4.174704   -3.297065 
             /cut2 |   .3904631   .1993544     1.96   0.050    -.0002643    .7811905 
             /cut3 |   2.532239   .2057365    12.31   0.000     2.129003    2.935475 
      -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador | 
         var(_cons)|   .2969584   .1123603                      .1414575    .6233978 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 203.95        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 0.42 | degrees of freedom: 1 | p-value: 0.52 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      0.41 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_c_fimagen)            Prob > chi2 =    0.5217 
      variable m_c_fimagen not found 
       
       
 
Level 2 predictor variable, controlling by level 1 variables: m_c_fimagen   
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -3515.019   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3515.0008   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3515.0008   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3420.0484 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3420.0484  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -3417.685  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3415.8668   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3411.3803   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3411.3672   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3411.3672   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(35)     =      32.30 
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      Log likelihood = -3411.3672                     Prob > chi2       =     0.5992 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                              | 
                    c_fimagen | 
                       Tacky  |   .2211196   .2876011     0.77   0.442    -.3425682    .7848073 
                              | 
                   taxi_color | 
                        Blue  |  -.1093159   .1969911    -0.55   0.579    -.4954114    .2767796 
                       Beige  |  -.0590784   .2588811    -0.23   0.819    -.5664761    .4483192 
                       White  |  -.1583724   .1396578    -1.13   0.257    -.4320967     .115352 
                        Gray  |  -.1431697   .1576272    -0.91   0.364    -.4521133     .165774 
                       Black  |  -.0726244   .1464894    -0.50   0.620    -.3597383    .2144896 
                      Silver  |   .0353874   .1461621     0.24   0.809    -.2510849    .3218598 
                         Red  |  -.0255048   .1695294    -0.15   0.880    -.3577762    .3067666 
                       Green  |  -.1039617   .2637583    -0.39   0.693    -.6209185    .4129952 
                 Other color  |    .170417   .2495013     0.68   0.495    -.3185966    .6594307 
                     No data  |   .2261816   .7586309     0.30   0.766    -1.260708    1.713071 
                              | 
                   taxi_marca | 
                   CHEVROLET  |   .2925179   .3388746     0.86   0.388    -.3716641    .9566999 
                      DAEWOO  |   .0441836   .4248878     0.10   0.917    -.7885813    .8769485 
                       HONDA  |   .1201763    .486644     0.25   0.805    -.8336285    1.073981 
                     HYUNDAI  |   .0560386   .3341981     0.17   0.867    -.5989776    .7110548 
                         KIA  |   .4095803    .332806     1.23   0.218    -.2427075    1.061868 
                       MAZDA  |   .1700406   .4451681     0.38   0.702    -.7024728    1.042554 
                  MITSUBISHI  |   .3990796   .4237981     0.94   0.346    -.4315493    1.229709 
                      NISSAN  |   .2348461   .3221665     0.73   0.466    -.3965887    .8662809 
                     RENAULT  |   .2084217   .5476372     0.38   0.704    -.8649275    1.281771 
                      SUZUKI  |   .1440319   .4637989     0.31   0.756    -.7649973    1.053061 
                      TOYOTA  |    .351318   .3226864     1.09   0.276    -.2811357    .9837717 
                  VOLKSWAGEN  |   .3881424   .3717584     1.04   0.296    -.3404906    1.116775 
                 Other brand  |   .2207425   .3429263     0.64   0.520    -.4513807    .8928657 
                     No data  |  -.0341993   .8226796    -0.04   0.967    -1.646622    1.578223 
                              | 
                    taxi_anho | 
                        2010  |   .0302061   .1750714     0.17   0.863    -.3129276    .3733398 
                        2011  |   .0152293   .1286651     0.12   0.906    -.2369496    .2674083 
                        2012  |   .0915124   .1358617     0.67   0.501    -.1747717    .3577964 
                        2013  |  -.0502219   .1344489    -0.37   0.709    -.3137369     .213293 
                        2014  |   .2191389   .1374846     1.59   0.111    -.0503259    .4886038 
                        2015  |   .0845977   .1311125     0.65   0.519    -.1723782    .3415735 
                        2016  |   .2889059   .1345392     2.15   0.032     .0252139    .5525978 
                              | 
              c_dÍadeobservac | 
                      Sunday  |  -.0926656   .0746747    -1.24   0.215    -.2390253    .0536941 
                              | 
                  c_horariogr | 
       Mid-afternoon (12-16)  |   .2740482   .0989433     2.77   0.006      .080123    .4679735 
           Afternoon (16-20)  |   .1852114   .1036748     1.79   0.074    -.0179874    .3884103 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        /cut1 |  -3.372939   .4161496    -8.11   0.000    -4.188577   -2.557301 
                        /cut2 |   .7749563   .4046273     1.92   0.055    -.0180986    1.568011 
                        /cut3 |   2.930108   .4083729     7.18   0.000     2.129712    3.730505 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador            | 
                    var(_cons)|   .3101481   .1174065                      .1476886    .6513155 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 207.27        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 32.30 | degrees of freedom: 35 | p-value: 0.60 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(34) =     32.10 
      (Assumption: m_c_fimagen nested in m_c_fimagen_L1)    Prob > chi2 =    0.5609 
       




Level 2 predictor variable, no controls: c_fvestimenta Attire  
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3532.1045   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3532.1045   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3434.2174 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3434.2174  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -3431.842  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3430.0913   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3427.4629   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -3427.454   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -3427.454   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(1)      =       0.34 
      Log likelihood =  -3427.454                     Prob > chi2       =     0.5583 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    | 
      c_fvestimenta | 
            Casual  |  -.1649644   .2818179    -0.59   0.558    -.7173173    .3873885 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
              /cut1 |  -3.909525   .2251379   -17.37   0.000    -4.350788   -3.468263 
              /cut2 |   .2166722   .2001028     1.08   0.279    -.1755222    .6088665 
              /cut3 |   2.358584   .2058945    11.46   0.000     1.955038     2.76213 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador  | 
          var(_cons)|    .298663   .1128584                      .1424067    .6263721 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 209.30        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 0.34 | degrees of freedom: 1 | p-value: 0.56 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      0.34 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_c_fvestime~a)         Prob > chi2 =    0.5602 
      variable m_c_fvestimenta not found 
       
       
Level 2 predictor variable, controlling by level 1 variables: m_c_fvestimenta   
Fitting fixed-effects model: 
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3518.3949   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3518.3828   
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      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3518.3828   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3421.1546 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3421.1546  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3418.7952  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3417.0029   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -3411.571   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3411.5548   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3411.5548   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(35)     =      31.92 
      Log likelihood = -3411.5548                     Prob > chi2       =     0.6174 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                              | 
                c_fvestimenta | 
                      Casual  |  -.1322944   .2906879    -0.46   0.649    -.7020322    .4374434 
                              | 
                   taxi_color | 
                        Blue  |  -.1080163   .1969918    -0.55   0.583     -.494113    .2780805 
                       Beige  |  -.0596116   .2588657    -0.23   0.818    -.5669791    .4477559 
                       White  |  -.1583665   .1396624    -1.13   0.257    -.4320998    .1153669 
                        Gray  |  -.1421379   .1576251    -0.90   0.367    -.4510775    .1668016 
                       Black  |  -.0721468    .146493    -0.49   0.622    -.3592678    .2149742 
                      Silver  |   .0353734   .1461677     0.24   0.809    -.2511101    .3218569 
                         Red  |  -.0259177   .1695333    -0.15   0.878    -.3581969    .3063614 
                       Green  |  -.1019844   .2637443    -0.39   0.699    -.6189138    .4149449 
                 Other color  |   .1706129   .2494713     0.68   0.494    -.3183419    .6595677 
                     No data  |   .2230826   .7586028     0.29   0.769    -1.263751    1.709917 
                              | 
                   taxi_marca | 
                   CHEVROLET  |    .290716   .3389143     0.86   0.391    -.3735438    .9549759 
                      DAEWOO  |    .041703   .4249134     0.10   0.922    -.7911118    .8745179 
                       HONDA  |   .1220421   .4866954     0.25   0.802    -.8318633    1.075948 
                     HYUNDAI  |   .0553328   .3342348     0.17   0.869    -.5997554    .7104211 
                         KIA  |   .4082394   .3328405     1.23   0.220     -.244116    1.060595 
                       MAZDA  |   .1676181   .4452102     0.38   0.707    -.7049779    1.040214 
                  MITSUBISHI  |   .3985629   .4238263     0.94   0.347    -.4321213    1.229247 
                      NISSAN  |   .2341375   .3222082     0.73   0.467     -.397379    .8656539 
                     RENAULT  |   .2066461   .5476217     0.38   0.706    -.8666727    1.279965 
                      SUZUKI  |   .1432638    .463793     0.31   0.757    -.7657537    1.052281 
                      TOYOTA  |   .3502247   .3227268     1.09   0.278    -.2823082    .9827576 
                  VOLKSWAGEN  |   .3866706   .3717921     1.04   0.298    -.3420285     1.11537 
                 Other brand  |   .2200705   .3429676     0.64   0.521    -.4521337    .8922747 
                     No data  |  -.0304598   .8226696    -0.04   0.970    -1.642863    1.581943 
                              | 
                    taxi_anho | 
                        2010  |   .0303534   .1750541     0.17   0.862    -.3127464    .3734532 
                        2011  |   .0161447   .1286721     0.13   0.900    -.2360479    .2683374 
                        2012  |   .0913194   .1358624     0.67   0.501     -.174966    .3576048 
                        2013  |   -.049791    .134454    -0.37   0.711    -.3133161     .213734 
                        2014  |    .218353   .1374857     1.59   0.112     -.051114    .4878201 
                        2015  |   .0843021   .1311108     0.64   0.520    -.1726704    .3412745 
                        2016  |   .2886725   .1345343     2.15   0.032     .0249901     .552355 
                              | 
              c_dÍadeobservac | 
                      Sunday  |  -.0946599   .0746385    -1.27   0.205    -.2409488    .0516289 
                              | 
                  c_horariogr | 
       Mid-afternoon (12-16)  |    .269039   .0989349     2.72   0.007       .07513    .4629479 
           Afternoon (16-20)  |   .1832995   .1037138     1.77   0.077    -.0199759    .3865748 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        /cut1 |   -3.55388   .4158078    -8.55   0.000    -4.368848   -2.738911 
                        /cut2 |   .5938423   .4039279     1.47   0.142    -.1978419    1.385526 
                        /cut3 |   2.749128   .4073855     6.75   0.000     1.950668    3.547589 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador            | 
                    var(_cons)|   .3178628   .1201868                      .1514931      .66694 
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      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 213.66        Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 31.92 | degrees of freedom: 35 | p-value: 0.62 
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(34) =     31.80 
      (Assumption: m_c_fvestime~a nested in m_c_fvestime~1) Prob > chi2 =    0.5760 
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Appendix I: Results of multilevel ordinal logistic regressions using variables at levels 1 
and 2 
Full L2 model 
Level 2 predictor variables, no level 1 controls (full L2) 
Level 2 all predictor variables: c_fsexo c_fedad c_ftez c_facento c_fimagen 
c_fvestimenta  . 
. meologit precio_cat $L2_list || c_observador:, 
      Fitting fixed-effects model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3462.4461   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3462.1783   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3462.1782   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood = -3430.7241 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3430.7241  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3424.8129  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3422.6231   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3421.7989   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3421.5447   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3421.5403   
      Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -3421.5403   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(7)      =      18.07 
      Log likelihood = -3421.5403                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0117 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    | 
            c_fsexo | 
            Female  |  -.3092238   .1948995    -1.59   0.113    -.6912197    .0727722 
                    | 
            c_fedad | 
             19-64  |  -.4697757    .239927    -1.96   0.050    -.9400239    .0004725 
               65+  |  -.2683313   .2384493    -1.13   0.260    -.7356835    .1990208 
                    | 
             c_ftez | 
             White  |   .5178298   .1949954     2.66   0.008     .1356458    .9000137 
                    | 
          c_facento | 
         Foreigner  |   .3374812   .1949202     1.73   0.083    -.0445553    .7195177 
                    | 
          c_fimagen | 
             Tacky  |   .1810937   .1948801     0.93   0.353    -.2008642    .5630517 
                    | 
      c_fvestimenta | 
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            Casual  |  -.1629161    .194864    -0.84   0.403    -.5448426    .2190104 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
              /cut1 |  -3.731554   .2761893   -13.51   0.000    -4.272875   -3.190233 
              /cut2 |   .3946438   .2568939     1.54   0.124    -.1088591    .8981467 
              /cut3 |   2.536761    .261917     9.69   0.000     2.023413    3.050109 
      --------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador  | 
          var(_cons)|   .1328933   .0538501                        .06006    .2940499 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 81.28         Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
       
       
       
Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 18.07 | degrees of freedom: 7 | p-value: 0.01 
      .         lrtest m_all_L2 m_null  
       
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(7)  =     12.17 
      (Assumption: m_null nested in m_all_L2)               Prob > chi2 =    0.0952 
       
       
 
Full L1 and L2 model 
Level 2 predictor variables with level 1 controls full L1 and L2) 
__Level 1 & 2 all predictor variables: taxi_color taxi_marca taxi_anho 
c_dÍadeobservac c _horariogr & c_fsexo c_fedad c_ftez c_facento c_fimagen c_fvestimenta 
__  
. meologit precio_cat $L1_list $L2_list || c_observador:, 
      Fitting fixed-effects model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3533.0037   
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3449.3762   
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3448.9782   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3448.9781   
       
      Refining starting values: 
       
      Grid node 0:   log likelihood =  -3416.435 
       
      Fitting full model: 
       
      Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -3416.435  (not concave) 
      Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3410.6079  (not concave) 
      Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3408.4139   
      Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3406.4287   
      Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3405.7705   
      Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -3405.7623   
      Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -3405.7623   
       
      Mixed-effects ologit regression                 Number of obs     =      3,537 
      Group variable:    c_observador                 Number of groups  =         16 
       
                                                      Obs per group: 
                                                                    min =        120 
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                                                                    avg =      221.1 
                                                                    max =        316 
       
      Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
       
                                                      Wald chi2(41)     =      47.99 
      Log likelihood = -3405.7623                     Prob > chi2       =     0.2106 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   precio_cat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                              | 
                   taxi_color | 
                        Blue  |  -.1108916   .1969381    -0.56   0.573    -.4968832    .2750999 
                       Beige  |  -.0599888    .258878    -0.23   0.817    -.5673803    .4474027 
                       White  |  -.1593696   .1396548    -1.14   0.254     -.433088    .1143489 
                        Gray  |  -.1442718   .1576034    -0.92   0.360    -.4531688    .1646252 
                       Black  |  -.0728195    .146461    -0.50   0.619    -.3598777    .2142387 
                      Silver  |   .0327723   .1461453     0.22   0.823    -.2536673    .3192119 
                         Red  |  -.0290614   .1695155    -0.17   0.864    -.3613057    .3031829 
                       Green  |  -.1054162   .2636154    -0.40   0.689     -.622093    .4112605 
                 Other color  |   .1638511   .2493781     0.66   0.511    -.3249211    .6526232 
                     No data  |   .2325494   .7584762     0.31   0.759    -1.254036    1.719135 
                              | 
                   taxi_marca | 
                   CHEVROLET  |   .2870713   .3388103     0.85   0.397    -.3769847    .9511274 
                      DAEWOO  |   .0344627   .4247331     0.08   0.935     -.797999    .8669243 
                       HONDA  |   .1253713    .486628     0.26   0.797     -.828402    1.079145 
                     HYUNDAI  |   .0485181   .3341415     0.15   0.885    -.6063871    .7034233 
                         KIA  |   .4050375   .3327482     1.22   0.224     -.247137    1.057212 
                       MAZDA  |   .1672014   .4452328     0.38   0.707    -.7054388    1.039842 
                  MITSUBISHI  |   .3895476   .4237213     0.92   0.358    -.4409309    1.220026 
                      NISSAN  |   .2291004   .3220981     0.71   0.477    -.4022003    .8604012 
                     RENAULT  |   .1988176   .5474032     0.36   0.716    -.8740731    1.271708 
                      SUZUKI  |   .1440167     .46368     0.31   0.756    -.7647793    1.052813 
                      TOYOTA  |   .3452292   .3226164     1.07   0.285    -.2870874    .9775457 
                  VOLKSWAGEN  |   .3819278   .3716508     1.03   0.304    -.3464944     1.11035 
                 Other brand  |   .2168799   .3428366     0.63   0.527    -.4550675    .8888273 
                     No data  |  -.0453888   .8224363    -0.06   0.956    -1.657334    1.566557 
                              | 
                    taxi_anho | 
                        2010  |   .0314828   .1750049     0.18   0.857    -.3115205    .3744862 
                        2011  |   .0193968   .1286735     0.15   0.880    -.2327986    .2715922 
                        2012  |   .0909676   .1358647     0.67   0.503    -.1753223    .3572575 
                        2013  |  -.0516814   .1343939    -0.38   0.701    -.3150886    .2117258 
                        2014  |   .2191373   .1374532     1.59   0.111     -.050266    .4885406 
                        2015  |   .0859443   .1311351     0.66   0.512    -.1710757    .3429643 
                        2016  |   .2874936   .1344955     2.14   0.033     .0238873    .5510999 
                              | 
              c_dÍadeobservac | 
                      Sunday  |  -.0933224   .0748034    -1.25   0.212    -.2399344    .0532896 
                              | 
                  c_horariogr | 
       Mid-afternoon (12-16)  |    .266493   .0989388     2.69   0.007     .0725766    .4604095 
           Afternoon (16-20)  |   .1754652   .1024135     1.71   0.087    -.0252616    .3761921 
                              | 
                      c_fsexo | 
                      Female  |  -.3240642   .2029094    -1.60   0.110    -.7217593    .0736309 
                              | 
                      c_fedad | 
                       19-64  |  -.4747281   .2494493    -1.90   0.057    -.9636397    .0141836 
                         65+  |  -.2626006   .2481166    -1.06   0.290    -.7489003     .223699 
                              | 
                       c_ftez | 
                       White  |   .4994238    .203093     2.46   0.014     .1013687    .8974788 
                              | 
                    c_facento | 
                   Foreigner  |   .3688159    .203042     1.82   0.069     -.029139    .7667709 
                              | 
                    c_fimagen | 
                       Tacky  |   .2200524   .2031334     1.08   0.279    -.1780819    .6181866 
                              | 
                c_fvestimenta | 
                      Casual  |  -.1300543   .2027549    -0.64   0.521    -.5274466     .267338 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        /cut1 |  -3.365935   .4511409    -7.46   0.000    -4.250155   -2.481715 
                        /cut2 |    .781952   .4407442     1.77   0.076    -.0818907    1.645795 
                        /cut3 |   2.937418    .444202     6.61   0.000     2.066798    3.808038 
      ------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      c_observador            | 
                    var(_cons)|   .1443103   .0582182                      .0654489     .318194 
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LR test vs. ologit model: chibar2(01) = 86.43         Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
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Test if parameters of equation are equal to zero: 
chi2: 47.99 | degrees of freedom: 41 | p-value: 0.21 
      .         lrtest m_all_L1_L2 m_all_L2  
       
      Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(34) =     31.56 
      (Assumption: m_all_L2 nested in m_all_L1_L2)          Prob > chi2 =    0.5880 
       
       
      ------------------------------------------------------- 
              name | command      depvar       npar  title  
      -------------+----------------------------------------- 
            m_null | meologit     precio_cat      4   
      m_taxi_color | meologit     precio_cat     15   
      m_taxi_marca | meologit     precio_cat     19   
       m_taxi_anho | meologit     precio_cat     12   
      m_c_dÍadeo~c | meologit     precio_cat      6   
      m_c_horari~r | meologit     precio_cat      7   
          m_all_L1 | meologit     precio_cat     43   
         m_c_fsexo | meologit     precio_cat      6   
      m_c_fsexo_L1 | meologit     precio_cat     45   
         m_c_fedad | meologit     precio_cat      7   
      m_c_fedad_L1 | meologit     precio_cat     46   
          m_c_ftez | meologit     precio_cat      6   
       m_c_ftez_L1 | meologit     precio_cat     45   
       m_c_facento | meologit     precio_cat      6   
      m_c_facent~1 | meologit     precio_cat     45   
       m_c_fimagen | meologit     precio_cat      6   
      m_c_fimage~1 | meologit     precio_cat     45   
      m_c_fvesti~a | meologit     precio_cat      6   
      m_c_fvesti~1 | meologit     precio_cat     45   
          m_all_L2 | meologit     precio_cat     17   
       m_all_L1_L2 | meologit     precio_cat     56   
      ------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix J1: Coefficients associated to characteristic at level 1 (vehicle and data 
collection characteristics) 
 
Effect of vehicle characteristics 
 No significant effect of color brand and year of the vehicle 
Data collection (experiment) characteristics: 
 Prices on Sunday (Domingo) are lower than prices offer to the client on Saturdays 












































Day of data colection:
Time of data colection:
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Ordered Logit coefficients
Multivariate models, Level 1 characteristics
